









This paper analyzed gender in the informal sector in Colombia, using the urban 
part of the Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida 1997, under the 
hypothesis that many informal women belong to this sector because it is more 
convenient for their childcare and house care needs. It is found that informal 
women are less in the lower strata than informal men, have better housing than 
informal men, and are covered by social security more often. More informal 
women have a family business in the household and work in their own home 
more often than informal men and tend to work between 6 and 11 hours less per 
week than informal men on average. Although fertility increases the woman’s and 
men’s probability of being informal, for a woman, having a child who stays with 
her most of the time during the week, either at home or at work, increases 
significantly her probability of being informal by 0.22, indicating that childcare 
contributes more to female than to male informality (for males it is not significant). 
When fertility is instrumented, this effect is revealed even larger. Models of log 
hourly wages/earnings were also estimated separately by gender and by sector 
of employment.  
 
 
JEL classification: J0, J2, I3 






                                                           
1 This paper was used a as a background paper for the Policy Research Report on Gender and 
Development. World Bank (forthcoming). The author wants to thank Elizabeth King for useful comments, 
Pablo Sanabria for valuable research assistance and Norman Offstein for helpful editing advice. 
2 Professor of Economics Universidad de los Andes – This research was conducted while the author was 
Postdoctoral Fellow Economic Growth Center Yale University. 
CEDE 
DOCUMENTO CEDE 2003-04 
ISSN 1657-7191 (edición electrónica) 





The popular view of the non-formal sector in developing countries is as an 
involuntary and transitory employment that provides meager earnings. However, 
Yamada
3 shows that the rewards to self-employed workers can be even higher 
than those obtained by wage earners, when self-employment is voluntary,
4 and 
therefore self-employment is not a “bad” option. In addition, self-employed 
individuals are outside of the government control and do not pay taxes. He finds 
that only those workers lacking social security or formal employment contracts 
are worse off than the rest. His study, however, is not disaggregated by gender. 
The hypothesis of this paper is that the decision to participate in the informal 
labor market differs between men and women, and in particular, that mothers 
who have to take care of young children tend to participate more in the informal 
sector of employment. 
  
Sethuraman (1998) mentions that “women face additional constraints because of 
their role as mothers and wives. Their choice is constrained because of their 
domestic and childcare responsibilities, which often oblige them to choose less 
productive and more vulnerable forms of activities such as homework. 
Alternatively they are obliged to operate a business in the neighborhood of their 
residence, which implies less lucrative and smaller scale of business…. Clearly 
these factors explain the extent of informality among women’s employment.” 
 
Before analyzing the gender aspects of informality, this paper contains a 
discussion on the various possible definitions of non-formal sectors. The first 
characteristic is self-employment (excluding professionals). Another criteria is the 
lack of social security. Another is related to the size of the firm. The last is related 
to the lack of formal labor contracts. This paper shows how these different criteria 
to define the non-formal sector may lead to a focus on groups that might be very 
different in nature.  
 
Analyzing whether or not the choice of participating in non-formal labor markets 
in Colombia is different between males and females, the paper’s main findings 
are that women with young children tend to participate more in the informal 
sector. This is particularly true for women who stay with their children at home or 
at work during most of the week. Another interesting finding is that the number of 
children not only has an impact on female participation in the informal sector, but 
also on male participation in this sector of the economy. The paper finds that the 
unemployment rate in the region where the individual lives has a positive impact 
on the decision of joining the informal sector. Finally, the paper will try to find 
whether some policies that affect the fertility decision of the woman (like child-
                                                           
3 “Urban non-formal employment and self-employment in developing countries: theory and evidence” 
Economic development and cultural change. January, 1996. 
4 For Peruvian data he shows that mean experience of self-employment is on average 6.4 years, evidence 
that self-employment is far from a transitory option.  
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care programs) have an impact on her decision of joining the non-formal or 
formal sectors. All these results, however, are sensitive to what definition of 
informal sector is adopted. 
 
Given that rural and urban labor markets are very different regarding the various 
definitions of informality and that female work in rural labor markets tends to be 
underestimated,
5 the focus of this paper is on the urban sector. This analysis 
covers a representative sample of all urban areas in Colombia, not only the 
seven or ten largest cities in the country as it is the case with the majority of the 
National Household Surveys from DANE. 
 
The paper consists of six sections. The first section contains a discussion on the 
main finding in the literature on the informal sector, in particular in Latin America. 
This section contains a review of the different definitions of the concept of 
informal sector existing in the literature, a discussion of the size of the sector in 
Latin America, and a summary of the main regulatory framework existing for the 
sector in Latin America. The review of the studies by gender and informality 
shows that few studies have analyzed the issues of this paper, particularly for 
Colombia.  
 
The second section describes the data. The data for this study comes from the 
“Encuesta Nacional de Calidad de Vida”, a national household survey taken in 
1997 in Colombia containing records of 38,518 persons. The urban part covers 
97 municipalities of the country. 
 
The third section includes a description of the definitions of informality used in 
this paper, how they relate to each other, how they define different sets of 
populations, and the main characteristics of these sets. It also contains a 
description of how different are the characteristics of males and females in the 
formal and informal sectors according to each definition. The rest of the paper 
keeps only two definitions of informal sector. The first definition characterizes the 
individuals according to their occupational position where those who participate in 
the informal sector are the self-employed (excluding professionals), the workers 
in the domestic service and the unpaid family workers. The second definition 
considers as informal workers those who work in firms without social security 
coverage and without a formal labor contract with their employer. 
 
The fourth section contains the estimation of Probit models of participation in the 
informal sector separately for men and women. In a second step, fertility 
variables are added to the model in order to see the size of the impact of having 
children on both male and female decisions of joining the informal sector. In a 
further step, the endogeneity of fertility is taken into account, and instrumental-
variables methods are used to estimate the unbiased effect of fertility on informal 
sector participation by gender.  
 
                                                           
5 In the sense that it usually is unpaid and not considered work.  
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The fifth section contains the estimation of Mincerian models of wages and 
earning for individuals in both sectors and by gender. The sample selection 
problem that arises when considering only the sample of formal or informal 
workers is addressed and corrected using the Heckman procedure. Section six 
contains simulations of the models from sections 4 and 5, and the conclusions 
are included in Section 7.  
 
 
1. Literature review  
 
This section reviews the empirical literature on non-formal sector employment 
especially in Latin America. It begins with a discussion of the different definitions 
of informal sector existing in the literature. It follows with a brief summary of 
findings in Latin America regarding the size of the informal sector. The third part 
is an overview of how the gender aspects of participation in the informal sector 
have been treated in the literature. Some aspects of the regulatory framework 
that governs informal labor in Colombia are discussed in the last section. 
 
1.1 The definitions 
 
According to Charmes (1990), the concept of informal sector dates to the early 
1970’s with the publication of the Kenya Report (1972) by the International Labor 
Office (ILO). It was due to the empirical fact that rural migration and urban growth 
gave rise to the development of small-scale activities providing rural migrants and 
urban dwellers with  means of surviving. ILO’s definition of informal sector 
included seven criteria: “ease of entry, unregulated and competitive markets, 
reliance on indigenous resources, family ownership of enterprises, small scale 
operation, labor intensive and adapted technology, skills acquired outside the 
formal school system.”
6 Sethuraman (1981) redefined ILO’s definition by stating 
that “the informal sector consists of small scale units engaged in production and 
distribution of goods and services with the primary objective of generating 
employment and incomes to their participants notwithstanding the constraints on 
capital, both physical and human, and know-how.”
7 PREALC’s
8 definition is that 
“the informal labor market consists of those persons who develop activities for 
self-employment, those who work in small firms and those who provide low-
productivity personal services”.
9 The concept involves the use of rudimentary 
technology, low labor productivity and that the businesses are unregulated, 
unlicensed and basically unknown to the governments. This allows the owners to 
avoid tax obligations, social security and minimum wage laws. In addition there 
exists the idea that working conditions in the informal sector are worse than in the 
formal sector and that working hours are more flexible. 
                                                           
6 Charmes, J. “A critical review of concepts, definitions and studies in the informal sector” in Turnham et al. 
(1990)  p.13. 
7 ILO definition in Sethuraman (1981), Contrapunto p.17. 
8 ILO’s regional employment program for Latin America and the Caribbean , in Spanish “Programa Regional 
de Empleo para America Latina y el Caribe” (PREALC). 
9 PREALC 1974 cited in Fields (1990) “Labour market modeling and the urban informal sector: theory and 
evidence”, In Turnham et al . (1990).  
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According to Sethuraman (1998), “informal employment consists of all 
employment in an economy that is outside the prevailing institutional framework. 
Informal employment, may be defined to include the following: a) self-employed 
or workers operating on own account, b) heads of microenterprises, c) unpaid 
workers and apprentices, d) wage workers (including paid family workers) in 
microenterprises, because they operate outside the recognised institutional 
framework, e) wage workers in the formal sector but belonging to the informal 
category, because their conditions of employment are not governed by the labor 
laws and regulations (i.e., the enterprises that engage these workers operate 
within the recognised institutional framework but part of the employment may be 
undeclared), f) wage workers not attached to any employer but who work 
regularly for households, and remain outside the recognised institutional 
framework (i.e., undeclared activities) e.g., domestic servants working for single 
or multiple households, g)  wage workers not attached to any employer that 
provide services to individuals, households and enterprises (including the 
government and its agencies) but on a casual basis, all of which remain outside 
the recognised institutional framework (i.e., undeclared activities) e.g., porters, 
messengers, babysitters, caretakers, brokers, etc.” 
 
By trying to make operational the definitions, based on the data restrictions, the 
literature offers also a wide range of different definitions of informal sector. 
According to Fields (1990), “Webb defines the informal sector to be small firms, 
plus all of the self-employed excluding liberal professions. Merrick defines the 
informal sector to be those employers who did not make payments to Brazil’s 
social security system. Banerjee defines the informal sector as all that are not 
employed in the government or in a private firm with more than 20 workers. 
Mazumdar classified workers in the factory sector as formal and those in small-
scale enterprises and casual employment as informal.”
10 According to Weeks 
(1975): “The formal sector includes government activity itself and those 
enterprises in the private sector which are officially recognized, nurtured and 
regulated by the State. … Operations in the informal sector are characterized by 
an absence of such benefits.” From the macroeconomic point of view, the 
“informal economic activity covers those activities which … are not recorded in 
the national income accounts.” 
11  
 
According to Fields (1990),
12 by definition the formal sector jobs pay better than 
the informal sector jobs because formal sector jobs are not available for all who 
seek them. Based on this fact, labor earnings have also been used as a criterion 
to define informal sector. Sethuraman (1981)
13 incorporates the view that labor 
productivity could be seen as a summary of a set of criteria defining informality, 
and suggested that the minimum legal wage should be used as a threshold for 
defining the informal sector. This, however, resembles the definition of poverty 
line, and “even though the poorest are in the main part of the informal sector,”
14 
                                                           
10 In Turnham et al. (1990) p.64 
11 Thomas, J.J. (1992). 
12 Labor market modeling and the urban informal sector: theory and evidence. In Turnham et al . p. 55. 
13 Cited in Turnham et al. (1990) p.15. 
14 In Turnham et al. (1990) p. 15.  
  6




According to Marquez (1994), by the early 1980’s many Latin American 
economists were working with labor market models that included an informal 
sector, trying to adopt empirically the notion as it was introduced by PREALC. 
The informal sector was first conceptualized as a problem of poverty and 
underemployment, leading to the conclusion that the size of the informal sector 
must be reduced. Later, the sector was equally seen as a potential tool for 
development.  
 
An extreme view of the informal sector as a tool for development extensively 
cited in the literature is the one introduced by Hernando de Soto (1989) in his 
book called “The other path.”
16 He argues that informality results from the 
promulgation of unjust and excessive regulations by local and national 
governments that limit enterprise. According to Bromley in Rakowski (1994),
17 
“De Soto’s informal activities are illegal because they do not comply with official 
regulations on licensing, location or form of operation. … At any time enterprises 
could be confiscated. … To minimize the risks the informals are forced to keep 
their business small … remain undetected, or to pay bribes to police and other 
officials so as to keep operating. The informals have no access to public credit, 
subsidies, technical assistance … because their businesses and homes do not 
officially exist as authorized activities and establishments”.  
 
Fields (1990) summarizes the results of previous studies by the following facts: i) 
some of the activities which appear to be free entry are not; ii) individuals working 
in small firms, in firms not covered by social security and in self-employment 
have been in those jobs for long periods of time,
18 and iii) many individuals who 
work in small firms or in self-employment are there by choice.
19 
 
These facts contradict the idea that “persons working in the [informal] sector are 
at the bottom of the job structure and hope to get out.”
20 Some authors refer to an 
“elite” inside the informal sector, which is constituted by the employers or firm 





                                                           
15 Poverty is defined at the household level, and informality at the individual level. 
16 The name of the famous guerilla movement in Peru was “Sendero Luminoso” or “Shining Path”.  
17 In Rakowski (1994) p.134. 
18 In Yamada (1996) it is shown that self-employed have been in their type of job for 7.5 years on average, 
and informal wage earners 2.4 years on average. 
19 Citing Fields, “When interviewed for the reasons for being informals many informal workers in Costa Rica 
gave the following answers most frequently: i) they felt they could make more money than they could earn in 
the formal sector, ii) even though they made less money they enjoyed their work more because it allowed 
them to choose their own hours, to work in the open air, to talk to friends, etc.”. p. 66 in Turnham et al. 
(1990). 
20 In Fields in Turnham et al (1990) p.68.  
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1.2 The size of the sector 
 
As it should be clear from the previous section, many difficulties arise when trying 
to compare data on informal sector across countries. The main difficulties lie in “i) 
differences in definition, ii) differences in sources and methods, and iii) 
differences in reference points.”
21 
 
Under the definition of “informal sector = non wage employment”, the size of the 
informal sector in Latin America was 26% in 1980 and increased to 30.7% in 
1985. In particular the size of the informal sector in Colombia was 32% in 1980 
and 35.4% in 1985.
22  
 
Based on a 1984 Colombian household survey, “Coyuntura Economica”
23 shows 
that 75% of the informal workers
24 work in retail. On the other hand, 46% of the 
industry urban employment is in firms of less than 10 workers and 56% of 
construction workers belong to the informal sector. They also find that the 
informal sector is mainly chosen by less educated workers: 81% of the workers 
with zero years of schooling and 70% of the workers with primary education 
belong to the sector. However, the percentage of informals among those with 
college education is far from being small (23%). 
 
Yamada (1996), using data from Peruvian household surveys, shows that in 
Metropolitan Lima between 1985-1986, 34.2% of the potential labor force were 
informal self-employed, and 19.4% were informal wage earners.
25 By 1990 both 
figures increased respectively to 37.2% and 21%. With the decline of GDP in 
Perú during that same period, the growth in the size of the informal sector in the 
period confirms a strong negative correlation between the level of per capita GDP 
and the share of informal employment in the labor force.
26  
 
The evidence has reported that wages and earnings in the informal sector are 
lower than in the formal sector. According to Sethuraman (1998), “in Bogotá 
(1984) for example 92 percent of informal sector workers earned below legal 
minimum wage of US$54 per month; in contrast, among formal sector workers, 





                                                           
21 Charmes in Turnham et al. (1990)  p. 31. 
22 Figures come from (page 22) Charmes, J. in Turnham et al. (1990) 
23 Publication by FEDESARROLLO. 
24 Defined as workers and patrons of firms of less than 10 workers, self employed (except independent 
professionals), family workers without pay and domestic servants. 
25 Defined as those workers with wage jobs but without formal contracts or social security. 
26 Yamada includes figures from a cross country self employment share for a number of countries sorted by 
per capita GDP data analysis, showing that whereas in Ghana the share of self employment is around 70% 
and in the Philippines of 40%, in the most developed countries is less than 10%. This figures are based on 
the World Development Report 1992.  
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1.3 Gender and the informal sector 
 
Barros et al (1995) study the gender gap in wages in metropolitan Brazil. Their 
analysis by type of employment shows that, relative to men, women are 
underrepresented in the highest income groups (employers), are equally 
represented in the self-employment category and are over-represented in the 
low-income group of informal employees.
27 By averaging data from each year 
between 1981 and 1989, they find that 20.3% of the female occupied labor force 
were self-employed and 16.7% were informal employees. The respective male 
percentages were 20.9% and 9.5%. 
 
Most of the gender aspects of informality in the literature have been analyzed 
from the point of view of the earnings differentials in the informal and formal 
sectors. Sethuraman (1998) mentions that “several studies in Latin America have 
attempted to assess the income differential by estimating earning functions 
based on data from household surveys. In Panama (1989) women self-employed 
were predicted to earn some 35 percent less than other women workers, which 
includes mostly wage employees in the formal sector. In urban Ecuador (1987), 
women employees in the formal sector earned 26.5 percent more than other 
women workers. … In urban Uruguay (1989), average income of women in the 
informal sector was predicted to be lower by 43 percent compared with the 
average income of other women workers. Average income of women in the 
informal sector in Colombia in 1986 was only 60 percent that of women in the 
formal sector.” 
 
In this paper it is shown that the male / female earnings differentials persist within 
the informal sector. However, the evidence shows that these are worse in the 
formal sector. Tokman (1987) [cited in Turnham et al p.39] analyzing the formal / 
informal earnings differentials by gender finds that earnings of self-employed 
men and women in Colombia
28 in 1984 were respectively 0.8 and 0.5 the 
average wage in the modern (formal) sector. In this paper it is found that 
earnings of self-employed men and women in Colombia
29 in 1997 were 
respectively 0.25 and 0.39 the respective average earnings in the formal sector, 
showing a much higher disparity between both sectors 13 years later. Looking at 
wages, it is found that wages of men who work in firms of ten or fewer workers 
are on average 0.5 the respective average male wage in firms with more than ten 
workers. For female average wages this relationship is 0.41. 
 
According to Sethuraman (1998), “income differential between men and women 
persists not only in the two sectors, but also across all employment categories. … 
The evidence from Brazil shows that women in the informal sector earned only 
34 percent of men’s income, also in the same sector. In Guatemala (1989), 
income of self-employed women was estimated to be 73 percent of self-
employed men. In Honduras (1989) income of self-employed women was only 62 
                                                           
27 It is not clear, however, what definition of informality they are using. 
28 This result is for the 10 largest cities. 
29 This result is for the urban sample of the ENCV-97 that covers the 10 largest cities and more urban areas.  
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percent that of self-employed men. Similar differences seem to exist in other 
countries, and in specific branches within the informal sector.”  
 
Comparing the earnings in the informal sector to the minimum wage by gender, 
Sethuraman (1998), reports that “in La Paz (in 1989) almost three quarters of 
women in informal employment earned below legal minimum wage but only 36 
percent of men were in a similar situation. In Panama in 1983, 76.8 percent of 
women in the informal sector earned below the legal minimum wage of US $140 
per month compared to only 51.3 percent of men in the same category.” The 
evidence is used to conclude that “a greater proportion of women in the informal 
sector have poorer quality of employment than men.” Similar findings for 
Colombia are reported by López (1996). He reports that in 1994 37.9% of self 
employed excluding professionals had earnings below the legal minimum wage, 
but his analysis is not separated by gender. 
 
Nothing, however, has been analyzed in Colombia to determine whether or not 
the reasons for participation in the informal sector are different by gender. 
 
 
1.4  Regulatory framework for the informal sector in Latin America 
 
In this section the regulatory framework that governs the non-formal sectors of 
employment in Latin America is briefly described. Clearly a complete analysis of 
these issues could take many pages, but it is not the objective of this study. 
 
According to Otero (1994),
30 the government and society attitude toward this 
sector have been experiencing changes in the last decades. As the informal 
sector grows in Latin American and Caribbean cities, most of the states have 
been changing their positions from a detached (lack of interest and no defined 
policies) or passive role (no position and maintains distance), to a more active 
(interested and defining national level policies) and directive role (defines role as 
an implementator of programs to promote the sector growth). The first to aid the 
informal sector in Latin America were the NGO’s, with the aim of creating and 
maintaining self-sufficient programs to alleviate poverty. In 1989, the countries 
that were adopting a more active and directive roles were Nicaragua, Guatemala 
and Colombia. Honduras, Bolivia and Brazil, on the other hand presented more 
passive roles toward the informal sector.  
 
According to López (1996), the recent reform of the Social Security introduced in 
Colombia (Law 100 of 1993) 
31 represents the biggest effort to “formalize the 
informal”. Other than that, the programs to promote the microenterprises have 
been the main component of the effort to alleviate the informality. “Colombia’s 
National Plan of Microenterprise Development started in 1982. … It channels 
                                                           
30 “The role of governments and private institutions in addressing the informal sector in Latin America” by 
Maria Otero, chapter 10 in Rakowski, 1994. 
31 “The Integral System of Social Security guarantees the rights of individuals to obtain the living standard 
according with human dignity through the protection from the contingencies that may affect them.” From Law 
100 of 1993 – Sistema de Seguridad Social Integral. Republica de Colombia.  
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resources and guarantees lines of credit for the informal sector through private 
foundations (including $8 million from the Inter-American Bank of Development) 
while the government also contributes (in this case $2 million). … The Plan 
coordinated lending with the largest and best known government training center 
in the country (SENA) which trains micro-entrepreneurs and conducts research 
on the informal sector.” 
32 Similar programs exist in other countries such as 
Ecuador and Guatemala. 
 
According to Otero (1994), the main advantages of having the governments 
involved in promoting the informal sector are that they can disseminate the 
information, obtain larger amount of funds, place the informal sector inside a 
macroeconomic perspective of the economy and mobilize human resources in 
public and private sectors. The disadvantages are the excessive bureaucracy, 
politization of programs, lack of real incentives to make programs work, and lack 
of mechanisms for long term sustainability. She concludes that the government is 
not the most appropriate implementator of micro-enterprise programs, but it 
should keep its active collaborator role coordinating various institutions involved.  
 
According to Marquez (1994),
33 the micro-enterprise promotion policies ended up 
supporting informal small firms that do not comply with legally established 
requirements in terms of wages, hours and job security. According to some 
authors cited in Marquez (1994), the existence of these illegal conditions of work 
is what creates the competitive advantages for the small firms to exist. “Ironically, 
this results in governments investing resources in those very enterprises that 
openly violate public regulation of the labor market. These same governments 
tend to deny requests by formal firms to change the overall system of labor 
regulations to allow for more hiring and firing flexibility”.
34 This leads slowly to 
create a two-tiered system, somehow encouraged by the states. How likely are 
these sort of policies to promote long term growth is something that remains to 
be seen. 
 
Informal employment is criticized for its fraudulent behavior that deprives the 
states of fiscal revenues as well as for its character of explotation of a weak and 
unprotected workforce that does not find employment in the modern sector of the 
economy. Very few literature has analyzed in detail the regulation of the informal 
employment in Colombia.  
 
According to López (1996), the legal minimum wage in Colombia cannot be 
judicially guaranteed for the independent workers and it is valid only “in principle” 
for the wage sector. The wages of the informals depend only on the nature of 
their small businesses and on the general behavior of the economy. In periods of 
growth the percentage of self employed with earnings below the minimum wage 
decreases, and the opposite happens in periods of depression. Similarly, 92% of 
the self-employed workers (excluding professionals) did not receive any kind of 
                                                           
32 Otero, in Rakowski, p. 191. 
33 “Inside informal sector policies in Latin America: an economist’s view” by Gustavo Marquez, chapter 9 in 
Rakowski, 1994. 
34 Márquez, in Rakowski, p. 171.  
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“prestaciones sociales” in 1994. The legal minimum work schedule (48 hours a 
week) does not apply for the informal sector (defined as independent workers), 
and 30% of them were offering more hours than that in June 1994. Particularly 
58% of domestic servants work more than 48 hours per week. 
 
The previous paragraphs show that the regulatory framework of informal sector in 




2. The data 
 
The data for this study comes from the Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de 
Vida 1997 (ENCV97), a national survey conducted by DANE
35 between July and 
December of 1997 in urban and rural regions of most “departamentos” of 
Colombia. The urban part of this survey covers 621 urban neighborhoods, 5,368 
urban housing units (a housing unit hosts one or more households), and 38,518 
persons, 50.6% of them are females. The urban sample has 21,625 individuals of 
all ages and 55.4% of the total population are covered by some sort of social 
security. 
 
From this sample, the children in the households younger than 12 and the 
children in the households younger than 5, that were children or step-children of 
the household head, were matched to the household heads and their respective 
spouses, in order to have a crude measure of fertility.
36 Characteristics of child-
care were also matched to the household head and spouse, to know how many 
of their young children are attending school, how many are staying home with 
one of the parents, or how many are going to child-care centers supported by 
government social programs. The final sample contains only individuals 18 years 
old and older, leaving a working sample of 13,471 individuals. Among them, 
those who are heads or spouses are linked to the number of children younger 
than 12 and the number of children younger than 5 and their child-care 
characteristics. 
 
The main module of the survey used in the paper includes individual 
characteristics (age, sex, rural origins, non-labor incomes and marital status), 
human capital characteristics and labor force characteristics. Regarding labor 
force, it covers aspects of labor contracts, working conditions, work place, hours 
of work, wages and earnings, social security coverage, and defines clearly the 
occupational positions and the sector of activity for each worker. In addition, the 
module contains data on use of social programs such as daycare centers, 
community mothers, food, school vouchers, credits and subsidies. Details of 
family background (where did the parents live and what was their occupation 
type) are also included. Some variables from the survey were aggregated at the 
                                                           
35 Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística. This is the government entity in charge of collecting 
household surveys in Colombia. 
36 Unfortunately the survey does not provide fertility information for all women, like specific fertility surveys 
do.  
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level of the municipality to be used as instruments for fertility (such as the use of 
childcare government programs). 
 
Data from the module that defines the main characteristics of the household 
(number of members in the household) and of the housing unit (material of walls, 
connections to basic services, number of rooms) is also included. The paper 
makes use of the survey module that characterizes the community where the 
individual lives, in terms of availability of parks, schools, health centers and so 
on. The survey has a special module on “condiciones de vida”
37 from which it 
was possible to extract information on some household assets (such as whether 
the household has television, car, refrigerator, etc.) A special module on family 
businesses is also included. There, it is evident that a large number of family 
businesses do not pay social security for their employees and do not pay taxes 
either.  
 
Other consulted sources were the ICBF,
38 for information on family planning 
programs that may affect fertility decisions, and the DANE-DNP,
39 for information 
on unemployment rates and on total male and female populations in each 
municipality in the survey year. These variables are used as instruments for 
fertility outcomes.  
 
 
3. Definitions of informal sector and descriptive statistics 
 
This section will discuss different definitions of informal employment that can be 
obtained from the data and the characteristics of the different groups formed 
using these alternative definitions. The characteristics of the different groups are 
also presented by gender. 
 
 
3.1  Definitions of informal sector 
 
Some of the definitions of informal sector most commonly found in Latin America 
are the following: 
•  urban  informal  self-employment 
40 
•   informal wage sector i.e. wage jobs without formal contracts or social 
security
41 
•   workers and patrons of firms of less than 10 workers, self-employed (except 
independent professionals), family workers without pay and domestic 
servants.
42  
                                                           
37 It mainly describes how the individual feels in his/her environment (security issues, reaction to attacks and 
confidence in the authorities). 
38 Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar. 
39 Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP). Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística 
DANE). 
40 Yamada, 1996.  
41 Yamada, 1996.  
42 FEDESARROLLO, 1985.  
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Self-employment excluding independent professionals. This is defined with 
“posición ocupacional” equal to “independent worker” or “worker in own farm”.
43 
“Independent professional” is a separate category in the list of possible 
responses and it is not included in this definition of informal worker. 
 
 
Definition 2:  
Family workers without pay, domestic servants and self-employment excluding 
independent professionals. This is defined with “posición ocupacional” adding the 
categories: “independent worker” or “worker in own farm”, “unpaid family worker” 
and “domestic servant”. 
 
Definition 3:  
Employment in firms of less than 10 workers. This is defined based on a specific 
question about the size of the firm.
 44 
 
Definition 4:  
Employment not covered by any sort of social security in health, not covered by 
social security in pensions and without formal labor contracts. This is defined by 
combining three questions: 1) Are you covered by social security in health? , 2) 
Are you affiliated to a pension fund, and 3) Do you have a formal labor contract? 
The informal sector here is defined as the set of workers that do not have social 
security in health, intersected with those that do not have social security in 
pensions, intersected with those that do not have formal labor contracts. 
 
At the descriptive level of this study, the four definitions are kept for the following 
reasons. First, the definition of informal sector as those workers who are self-
employed excluding independent professionals is widely used in the informal 
sector literature not only in Latin America, but throughout the world. It involves 
the idea of a small entrepreneur who participates in the market as an individual. 
A second definition commonly reviewed in the literature adds to the previous 
group the unpaid family workers and domestic servants. This constitutes a wider 
group of population enlarging the informal sample. Clearly the unpaid family 
workers and domestic servants are workers who earn less than the others, and 
the character of their work is highly “informal”. It does not require formal 
education, the relationship between the employer and the employee can be 
terminated at any time and the working hours are flexible. The third definition 
related to the size of the firm (of less than ten workers) also tries to capture the 
                                                           
43 Given that the sector considered is only urban, only 1% of workers belongs to the category of “worker in 
own farm”. 
44 The question of firm size in the questionnaire is given as: how many persons including you work in the 
firm or business? And the answers are: a) Only you, b) 2 to 5 persons, c) 6 to 10 persons, d) 11 to 49 
persons, e) 50 or more.  
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self-employed as well as work in the medium, small and micro-enterprises.
45 
These firms, due to their size, are believed to be more capable of “avoiding social 
security payments, minimum wage legislation, regulations concerning working 
conditions, hours and age restrictions, resulting in increased outwork and sub-
contractual contracts”.
46 Finally, the definition that captures the informality of 
labor arrangements regarding the lack of social security in health or in pensions, 
as well as the lack of formal labor contracts, proves to be the one that defines a 
smaller group of the population. This latter one probably defines the group that is 
working in more “informal” conditions.
47  
 
The application of each definition shifts significantly the number of workers 
participating in the informal sector. Table 1 shows the percentages of workers 
classified in the informal sector depending on each definition. 
 
 
Table 1. Size of the urban informal sector 
Definitions of informal employment  Informal 
workers 
1. Self-employed (excluding professionals) plus workers in own 
farm 
36.5% 
2. Self-employed (excluding professionals), plus workers in own  
farm, plus domestic servants, plus unpaid family workers 
 
43.4% 
3. Workers in firms with 10 or fewer workers  63.6% 
4. Workers without labor contracts and without social security health 





Table 1 shows that the size of the non-formal sector is large, under any definition 
of non-formal sector. In particular, when the criterion of working in small firms is 
used, almost 64% of the occupied labor force are informal. The most restrictive 
definition is definition four, under which the size of the informal sector is the 
smallest, but still involves more than a quarter of workers. 
 
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
The following descriptive analysis shows the main aspects of the samples formed 
using each definition, and also how these definitions overlap with each other. In 
order to look at the characteristics of the informal workers compared with the 
formal workers, consider first the descriptive statistics of the sample. Table 2 
                                                           
45 In Spanish called “pymes = pequeñas y medianas empresas.” 
46 Rakowski, 1994, p. 28. 
47 This is what Yamada (1996) found.  
  15




Table 2. Sample sizes 
  All  Col. %  Males  Col. % Females  Col. % 



































48 contains descriptive statistics of the main characteristics of individuals 
from the whole sample (18 years old or older) desegregated in three groups: 
those out of the labor force,
49 those that are unemployed,
50 and workers.
51 This 
total sample has 55% males and 45% females. In general individuals out of the 
labor force are older, and unemployed individuals are younger. The majority of 
persons out of labor force are married and they perceive non-labor incomes more 
frequently and on average higher than the other two groups. The size of the 
household is higher for unemployed individuals, who also on average have more 
children and are more represented among the lowest socioeconomic strata for 
public services prices. Differences in housing or neighborhood characteristics are 
not striking, but one can say that conditions are slightly better for workers than for 
the other two samples. Also workers and unemployed have on average more 
years of schooling than persons out of the labor force. Individuals out of the labor 
force are those who suffer more from chronic diseases and claim to have a very 
good health status less frequently. 
 
Of all workers, 48% have a labor contract.
52 Of those who have a labor contract, 
only 19% have a fixed term contract. Of those who have a fixed term contract, 
41% have a contract for 6 months or less and only 2% have a contract for more 
than a year. Around 24% of workers do not receive “prestaciones sociales”
53 and 
                                                           
48 The tables that are not included in the text are included in Appendix 1. 
49 Out of the labor force are those who are not workers or unemployed. 
50 The unemployed category includes those who have made some job search in the last week or in the last 
12 months before the survey. 
51 The workers category includes: a) those who worked the week before the survey, b) those that did not 
work that week but did have a job, c) those who worked in a family business without payment for more than 
15 hours in the last week and d) those who worked last week for one hour or more with pay. 
52 Definitions of labor contracts, fixed term labor contracts and indefinite term labor contracts are included in 
Appendix 2. 
53 “Prestaciones sociales” is what by law the employer owes to the employee to cover for the risks incurred 
by the worker when he enters the labor relationship.  It is not a wage because it is not paid as retribution for 
work, and it is not a premium because it does not depend on damages caused by the employer. It includes  
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only 33% are affiliated to a pension fund.
54 Social security in health covers 65% 
of workers.
55 The mean workweek lasts 47.7 hours
56 and 64% of workers are 
employed in firms of ten workers or less. Most workers (56%) receive wages, 
42% of workers receive earnings and 2% of workers do not receive wages or 
earnings.
57 The mean hourly wages are 2,158 Colombian pesos
58 and the mean 
hourly earnings are 1,713 Colombian pesos. The main sectors of urban 
economic activity are services (32%), retail (26%) and industry (16%).  
 
Table 4 presents the statistics of the main variables for various classifications of 
workers under the different definitions of the formal and informal sectors 
considered in the paper. The analysis of those tables shows a series of stylized 
facts about the informal sector in Colombia that are true under any definition of 
informal sector. Informal workers are older than formal workers and tend to be 
more from rural origins than formal workers. They also tend more to be informal 
in their marital agreement, in the sense that free union is more likely to be their 
marital status. Their non-labor incomes are on average smaller and they receive 
them less frequently (except for lottery rewards). Their families tend to be larger 
and their houses have on average fewer rooms for the family members. Given 
that the measure of children used here does not come from a specific fertility 
survey, the means of number of children younger than 12 or younger than 5 may 
not be very accurate.
59 Therefore, even if one would expect that informal workers 
also have more children, the means of the data do not confirm it.
60 The fact that 
informal workers are on average older may imply the fact that they have less 
young children.
61 Informal workers are more represented among the lowest 
socioeconomic strata, live in houses and neighborhoods with less “good” 
conditions than formal workers, and tend more frequently to have family 
businesses in their own houses.  
 
Regarding the working conditions, the table shows that they are more or less 
similar in both formal and informal sectors. Contrary to what was expected, 
formal workers complain more frequently than informal workers for excess 
requirements of physical or intellectual effort in their work, and more informal 
                                                                                                                                                                             
benefits for work accidents, illness and maternity leaves among others. See Appendix 2 for the complete 
definition. 
54 A pension fund is a fund where the worker saves his pensions. It can be private (the worker chooses to 
which fund to be affiliated) or it can be the Instituto de Seguros Sociales [ISS]. The objective of the pensions 
is to guarantee the coverage for contingencies such as aging (retirement), disabilities and death. According 
to the Law 100 of 1993, the retirement pension is assumed by the ISS or by the private pension funds. 
55 An individual covered by social security in health has the right to receive a basic package of services or 
benefits in health (Mandatory Health Plan- in Spanish Plan Obligatorio de Salud [POS]). These services are 
provided by the EPS (in Spanish Entidad Promotora de Salud), which are the basic units of the Social 
Security System of Health (Sistema de Seguridad Social en Salud). 
56 The legal maximum working week lasts 48 hours. See detailed explanation in Appendix 2. 
57 Wages and earnings are reported in two separate questions. 
58 Figures in Colombian pesos of 1997. In 1997 the exchange rate with U.S. dollars was approximately 1000 
Colombian pesos for one dollar. 
59 The construction of these variables was previously explained in the data section. 
60 By checking the survey it was found that the informals are heads of household or spouses as frequently 
as the formal workers.  
61 In addition, it is likely that informal workers delay less the decision of having children, maybe due to their 
lower education levels or their higher rural origin which would also contribute to the evidence that on 
average they have less young children.
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workers claim to have “no problem” in their working conditions than formal 
workers do. One could also argue that formal workers could be expected to 
complain more because their higher education makes them have higher 
expectations about their working environments, or because they work in 
environments where their complaints are more likely to be taken into 
consideration by their employers. 
 
Probably due to the differences in activities they perform, the working places 
differ highly between both sectors. Informal workers work very frequently in the 
house where they live (between 22% and 30%) or in the street (between 12% 
and 17%), while formal workers tend to go to their company’s offices (between 
56% and 70%). This coincides with the fact that mean commuting time is smaller 
for informal workers. This also coincides with a hypothesis of this paper that 
many informal workers (mainly women) may choose to belong to this sector 
because it is more convenient for their childcare and house care needs. 
 
Table 5 is derived from Table 4 to show the differences in the most important 
variables of that table. The education gap between formal and informal workers is 
always positive, and highest under definition 3 (workers in large firms have on 
average 3.3 more years of schooling than workers in firms with 10 or fewer 
workers). Contrary to a common perception, informal workers spend on average 
2 to 3 hours less at work per week than formal workers under the first three 
definitions of informality. Under the last definition, the difference in hours between 
formal and informal workers is negligible. Regarding wages and earnings, the 
differences between the two sectors are more striking. Hourly wages are 
considerably higher for formal workers. The differences in hourly earnings are 
even higher. Notice here that under our definitions not all the informal workers 
receive earnings but some receive wages, and also not all the formal workers 
receive wages, but some receive earnings.
62 The wages and earnings gaps 
between formal and informal workers obtained from the data are very large. 
According to Definition 2 (self employed excluding professionals, domestic 
servants and unpaid family workers), hourly wages in the informal sector are 29% 
of hourly wages in the formal sector, and hourly earnings in the informal sector 
are 27% of hourly earnings in the formal sector. According to Definition 3 (firm 
size of 10 or less) the size of these gaps is 45% and 36% respectively.  
 
 
3.3 Descriptive statistics by gender 
 
Given that the focus of this paper is whether or not women and men participate in 
the informal sector for different reasons, it is interesting to show the previous 
statistics for the samples desegregated by gender. This analysis is included in 
Table 6. 
 
                                                           
62 In the survey there is a specific question for wages and a specific question for labor earnings. They are 
separate and an individual can only have a positive entry in one of them, not in both.  
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Informal women tend to have slightly less children than informal men and similar 
number of children as formal women. This, however, might be due to the fact that 
only young children who can be linked as sons of the household head are being 
considered. The fact that the informal samples are older implies that they are less 
likely to have small children, which may be causing in part this result.  
 
Looking at the generalities of socioeconomic strata, informal women are less in 
the lower strata than informal men, and informal women have slightly better 
housing characteristics than informal men. They also tend to be covered by 
social security more often. More informal women declare having a family 
business in the households. According to all definitions, informal women tend to 
work in their own home more often than informal men do (46% of women and 
16% of men under Definition 2) or in someone else’s home (25% of women and 
8% of men under Definition 2). 
 
Table 7 is derived from Table 6 to show the differences in the most important 
variables from that table. The education gap between informal men and informal 
women is small, indicating that among the informal, men and women have similar 
education levels (the sign of the gap differs across definitions). Informal men are 
on average 2 years older than informal women. Informal women tend to work on 
average between 6 and 11 hours less per week than informal men (the size of 
the gap changes between definitions). Informal women gain lower hourly wages 
and earnings than informal men, but the gender gap in wages or earnings is not 
as large as in the formal sector in general. The relationship varies according to 
the definition of informal sector that it is being used. For example, looking at 
Definition 2, hourly earnings of formal females are on average 54% of male 
formal hourly earnings, and the percentage in the informal sector is 84%. Looking 
at Definition 3, hourly wages of formal women are 95% and in the informal sector 
hourly wages of women are 78% of male. 
 
 
3.4 Why the rest of the paper keeps only two definitions of informal sector? 
 
The descriptive analysis of the previous section, based on four definitions of 
informal sector, shows that there are some trends that differentiate the two sector 
of the economy that are captured in some sense by any definition. Given the 
heterogeneity of the informal sector, it is clearly hard to keep a single definition of 
informal labor market. Since it is possible that these definitions are including 
similar populations, Table 8 provides statistics for the combinations between the 
different definitions, showing how the different definitions overlap with each other. 
For example, 52% of the informal workers under definition 1, are also informal 
under Definition 4. The highest overlaps are the following: 95% of workers in 
Definition 4 and 95% of workers in definitions 1 and 2 also work in firms of 10 or 
less workers (i.e. lie under definition 3).
63 In that respect, definitions 1, 2 and 4 
would be preferable to definition 3, in the sense that they are keeping a smaller 
fraction of workers. 
                                                           
63 This is not surprising, given the large size of the sector implied by definition 3.  
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Definition 2 covers a wider population than definition 1 but it may identify better 
the individuals who may be at a disadvantage. In addition, the inclusion of unpaid 
family workers and domestic servants captures a larger number of females, who 
are the focus of this study. Therefore, from Definitions 1 and 2, Definition 2 is 
kept.  
 




Table 9. Interaction between Definitions 2 and 4 
   Definition 4   


































                       
The fact that most of the informals under Definition 4 (87%) are also informals 
under Definition 2, implies that Definition 4 is including Definition 2. It is 
interesting, however, to consider that the two definitions have a different “nature” 
in the sense that they come from different questions in the survey. The first one is 
based on the occupational categories, and the second one is based in the 
existence of labor contracts and coverage of social security for health and 
pensions. In addition to this, Definition 2 is including relatively more informal 
women (47% of informals under Definition 2 are women and 40% under 




4. Models of participation in the informal sector 
 
In this section the choice of participation in the informal labor market is modeled 
as a the result of socioeconomic and environmental characteristics of the 
individual. The individual’s education, age, birthplace or sex determine his or her 
participation in this sector. Other variables that may affect participation in one or 
the other sector can be characteristics of the environment where the individual 
lives or aspects of the specific labor markets. Other specific characteristics of the 
household, such as the number of young children, may also imply that an 
individual may decide to participate in the informal sector because it offers a 
more flexible work schedule or because the work can be performed at home. The 
section is divided into four parts. First, the choice of participation in the informal  
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labor market is modeled as a result of socioeconomic and environmental 
characteristics of the individual, without considerations of number of children. The 
variables related to the number of children are included in Section 4.2. The third 
section contains a model of fertility for men and women. The last section 
considers fertility as a result of the process described by the model of section 4.3, 




4.1 Probit model of participation in the informal sector 
 
In this section, the choice of participation in the informal labor market is modeled 
as a result of socioeconomic and environmental characteristics of the individual. 
The individual’s education, age, birthplace or sex determine his or her 
participation in this sector. Some characteristics of the environment where the 
individual lives (neighborhood characteristics and social programs) and of the 
specific labor markets (the unemployment rate, the labor force participation rate, 
the proportion of employment in “industry” or the size of the city) may be linked to 
the decision of participating in the informal sector. 
 
The main hypothesis is that the different characteristics of men and women make 
them more or less likely to enter this sector of employment. Specifically, this 
paper will test whether or not women with young children may be more likely to 
participate in the informal labor market. A variety of reasons may lead to this 
behavior. It may be because the informal sector provides more flexible 
schedules, less hours of work, more possibilities to work at home, presenting 
overall characteristics that may alleviate the load of child care.
64 However, in the 
paper the choice of sector is not modeled as depending on the characteristics of 
the work,
65 but on the characteristics of the individuals. 
 
In this section, a model of sector participation is estimated for the whole sample 
of workers.
66 Participation in the labor force, a choice that varies highly between 
men and women, is a subject of other studies such as Ribero and Meza (1996) 
and would divert us from the focus here. The implicit assumption is that 
individuals belong to the workers sample randomly and selection bias issues are 
not considered. Clearly this is a strong assumption, but it is imposed in order to 
simplify the analysis and to focus on the informal sector, rather than on the 
participation decision or unemployment.  
 
                                                           
64 It may be that the informal sector is the only choice for women who may have lost their jobs or had to quit 
them to have children and later do not find the opportunity to be reinserted in the formal sector. This 
analysis, however, would require of detailed panel data and unfortunately cannot be tested with this data. 
65 As is the case in the conditional logit models explained in Greene (1997), p. 914-915. 
66 Multinomial logit models were estimated for all individuals in the labor force, assigning the numbers 1 for 
unemployed, 2 for informal workers and 3 for formal workers. Leaving 3 as a base category for this model, 
the coefficients for the informal sector were very similar to the coefficients of a Logit model of the same sort 
as (1). The coefficients for the multinomial logit, however, are more difficult to interpret intuitively. Therefore 
the model is estimated as a binary choice only for workers.  
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The model to estimate is given by: 
  
zi
* = γ ’ pi + ui 
zi = 1  if  zi
* > 0 
zi = 0  if  zi
* ≤  0 
Prob(zi = 1) = Φ  (γ ’ pi) 
Prob(zi = 0) = 1- Φ  (γ ’ pi)    (1) 
 
The dependent variable in the models zi = 1 when the individual i works in the 
informal sector and zi = 0 when individual i works in the formal sector. Φ   is the 
standard normal cumulative distribution function, the error term u is assumed to 
be distributed with mean zero and variance one, i refers to individuals and γγγγ  are 
the parameters estimated in the Probit model. The variables pi determine the 
decision of participation in the informal sector.  
 
The model is estimated for the whole sample and separately for men and 
women. Tests of differences in the male and female coefficients in the separate 
gender models have been performed implying that the model deserves to be 
estimated separately for men and women. Only these results are included. 
 
The independent variables are: 
•  Age; 
•   Non-labor income (the sum of non-labor incomes that are ‘permanent’ to the 
person);
67 
•  Year  of  Schooling; 
•   Dummy variable =1 if the father has some years of secondary schooling or 
higher education level;
68 
•   Number of rooms in the house divided by number of persons in the 
household; 
•   Dummy variable =1 if the house has telephone service; 
•   Dummy variable =1 if the house has color television; 
•   Dummy variable =1 if there is running water in the majority of houses of the 
neighborhood;  
•   Unemployment rate in 1997 in the region
69 where the person lives. 
 
                                                           
67 This sum does not include lottery prizes or gains from sale of properties because these type of non-labor 
income are not ‘permanent’ and therefore may be less likely to determine labor decisions of an individual. 
68 The inclusion of this variable implies a decrease in the sample sizes, since there are many missing in this 
variable. The variable is kept only in some specifications, for being the only measure of the impact of human 
capital from one generation on the following generation. 
69 Unemployment rates are calculated in the seven major cities and extrapolated to other urban areas in 
same departamento. The values are summarized in Table 12C.  
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The results of these models are summarized in Table 10. The first two columns in 
the first page of the table are for female informality under Definition 2, and the 
two last ones for male informality under Definition 2. The second page is for 
informality under Definition 4. The values in the columns of derivatives indicate 
the changes in the probability of being informal as a response to an infinitesimal 
change in the variable of interest. The sample of females has 3,206 observations 
and the sample of males has 4,365 observations. When the dummy that 
indicates the individual father’s education is taken into account as an explanatory 
variable, the samples decrease in size to 2,325 and 3,168 respectively. 
 
The results under Definition 2 of informality indicate that for both samples older 
individuals tend to participate in the informal sector more than younger 
individuals.
70 The relationship between informality and age might be related to a 
life cycle mentioned by López (1996): “Since modern enterprises hire preferably 
young workers and discriminate against older individuals, they, using the labor 
savings from previous wage jobs, tend with age to establish small businesses”. 
 
The wealth indicators “have a color television” and “have a washing machine” or 
“having telephone service” as well as non-labor income are jointly significant and 
operate negatively, i.e. that the more the individual has of them, the less likely is 
to be informal. Similarly, “having running water in the neighborhood” is significant 
and operates in the same sense, but it is significant only for men. More years of 
schooling decrease the likelihood of being in the informal sector. One more year 
of education for a woman reduces in 0.05 the probability of being informal. For 
men the reduction in the probability of an additional year of schooling is of 0.02. 
Similarly, the higher the father’s education, the less likely the person is in the 
informal sector, but this is significant only for women. This effect is almost twice 
as large as the own education effect. The higher the unemployment rate in the 
region where the person lives, more likely the person is informal, and also this 
coefficient is significant only for women. This result coincides with the fact that 
when the economy is growing faster the informal sector decreases in size, as 
mentioned by López (1996). The female model has a higher pseudo-r-squared 
than for men. 
 
The next columns present the model estimated separately for men and women 
under Definition 4. The results for schooling indicate that also with this definition 
the penalty for having less education (or the reward for having more education) is 
higher for females than for men, in terms of belonging to the informal relative to 
the formal sector. For a woman, one more year of education represents a 
significantly higher decrease in the probability of being informal than for men. 
Some variables are significant in one model and not in the other, like non-labor 
income, having a telephone and living in a neighborhood with running water are 
significant for males and not for females. Also with this definition, the father’s 
                                                           
70 A dummy variable for “born in rural areas” was introduced but it was highly correlated with education. Its 
sign in the model without education was positive, indicating that persons with rural origin are more likely to 
be informal than those who come from urban areas.  
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education is significant for females and not for men. The models with Definition 2 
have a better overall fit than the models with Definition 4.   
 
 
4.2 Probit model of participation in the informal sector with fertility 
variables 
 
Table 11 shows the coefficients of model (1) estimated for men and women 
separately, including two new variables: 
 
•   The number of children younger than 12, children of the household head or 
spouse;  
•   The number of children younger than 5, children of the household head or 
spouse that during the most part of the week spend the time with one of their 
parents either at home or at work. 
 
This is designed to capture the intuition that one of the main differences between 
men and women that determines the choice of sector of the economy can be 
related to the number of children. A woman may prefer to choose the informal 
sector because she might be more likely to take care of the home and children. 
This change is included in a separate model because the fertility variable may be 
endogenous, and therefore the unobservables in the model may be correlated 
with unobservables that determine fertility. This endogeneity issue will be dealt 
with later. 
 
Due to the form in which the fertility variable is built, the sample consists only of 
household heads or their spouses. Other individuals who might also be workers 
in the formal or informal sector and might also have children are not included in 
the samples. For example a daughter of the household head who lives in the 
household may have young children, but she is excluded from the sample 
because she is not a household head or spouse of the household head. The 
sample of women who are household heads or spouses has 2,123 individuals. 
The sample of men who are household heads or spouses has 3,159 individuals. 
  
Table 11 is also presented first for females and males under Definition 2, and 
then under Definition 4. In the first two columns of the first page of Table 11, the 
variables of children are not instrumented, but they are as provided by the data 
(raw). Both variables are significant and positive on the probability of a woman to 
be informal under Definition 2. Having one more child younger than 12 increases 
the woman’s probability of being informal by 0.03. Having one more child 
younger than 5 to take care of (presumably the parent who is taking care of the 
children is the mother, however, this is not specified in the question) increases 
her likelihood of informality by 0.20, the largest effect on the model, except for the 
unemployment rate. For men (second page) the number of children younger than 
12 also is significant (a little bit less than for women) and positive on being 
informal under Definition 2, and its impact on increasing the probability of  
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informality is smaller (it increases the probability in 0.02), but the second variable 
has no significance. 
 
The results of estimating the model with Definition 4 (first two columns of the next 
two pages of Table 11) show large differences in the size of the coefficients and 
their significance. In addition to differences in the probability of being informal 
relative to being formal under Definition 4 observed in the other variables, the 
children variables appear to be not significant under any model when Definition 4 
is used, particularly for women and the signs are counterintuitive. This result, 
however, may change when the children variables are considered as 
endogenous.  
 




4.3 Fertility regressions 
 
This section considers the issue that fertility is not an exogenous variable but that 
it is also an individual’s choice. Economic analysis of fertility assumes that the 
utility of the parents depends on the “quantity” and “quality” of children (Becker, 
1960). Parents search for the most suitable combination of number of children, 
their quality and other commodities to produce and consume. The endogenous 
variable for fertility is based in the following model: 
 
yi  = a + Σ  bj Xji + Σ  ck Cki  + Σ  dh Hhi + ui  
ui   ~ Normal(0,σ u 
2)       (2) 
 
The dependent variable yi  is the number of children younger than 12, sons of a 
household head or his/her spouse, X contains only exogenous endowments that 
are not modified by the individual or family and C are reproducible forms of 
human capital. H contains variables that define the environment of the labor 
market and social programs that may affect fertility for individuals in a given 
region. The parameters a,  b, c and d are estimated, the error term  u  is 
assumed to be zero mean independently distributed, i refers to individuals, and j, 
k  and  h  refer to the specific variables in the sets denoted X,  C and H 
respectively. 
 
This model is estimated separately for men and women, since tests of the 
coefficients in both models imply that they are statistically different.
71  
 
The reduced form above takes into account that fertility is the result of socio-
demographic characteristics of the parents, as well as of environmental 
constraints. The community availability of childcare, as well as other programs of 
                                                           
71 These results are not included.  
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nutrition and education may make it less of a burden to have a child. The 
availability of community programs for family planning on the other hand may 
reduce the number of children in a family. 
 
There are some available instruments to explain fertility. The first group is formed 
by some information on family planning programs, summarized in Table 12A and 
12B. This information exists for few periods of time (this paper consider only the 
years 1995 and 1986), and it was matched for each individual corresponding with 
the municipality where the person was living before.  
 
Migration can be taken into account only partially with this survey. The survey 
provides answers to the questions: “How long have you been living here?” and 
“In what municipality were you living before coming here?”  There are no specific 
questions for the municipality where the individual was living five or ten years 
prior to the survey. In order to take into account this type of migration, some 
assumptions had to be made. If a respondent lives in a given municipality in 1997 
and has been living there for 5 years or less, the relevant labor market indicators 
of 1992 for that individual are those in the municipality where the person was 
living at that time. Here it is assumed that the municipality where the person was 
living prior to the current location is where that individual resided in 1992. 
Similarly, it is assumed that this person lived in that same place in 1986 and 
1987.
72 The same match was made for the 1986 family planning programs and 
the 1987 labor market indicators (ten years before the ENCV97 survey) for those 
who migrated more than five years ago but less than ten.
73 However, the 1986 
family planning programs did not show any impact on fertility, and only the 1995 
variables proved to be significant. 
  
On the other hand, from the same survey ENCV97, the number of children 
younger than five that attend the “hogares de madres comunitarias del ICBF” and 
the “CAIP”
74 ’s as main or secondary “activity” in a week, were added at the 
municipality level. Then, the numbers were normalized by the number of children 
in those age groups in the sample and in the municipality. These two variables 
were also included as determinants of fertility. However, only the first one 
showed a significant correlation with fertility. 
 
Another variable analyzed as a possible determinant of fertility was the sex ratio 
(defined as the number of males over the number of females in the municipality). 
This variable is an indicator of the marriage markets in the region, and in other 
studies (Ribero, 1999) has proved to be positively correlated with fertility. 
However, in this case it was never significant. This might be due to the fact that 
the sample of analysis consists of persons who have children of the head of the 
household or spouse. In regressions determining the marital status of individuals 
in this sample the sex ratio was positive and highly significant.
75 However, the 
                                                           
72 In other words, the implicit assumption is that migrants have migrated only once in their lifetime. 
73 This procedure was implemented in all the models also for the unemployment rate and labor force 
participation rate relevant to where the migrant individual was living before moving. 
74 A government supported program of integral care to minor children younger than 5. 
75 These results are not included.  
  26
fact that this sample mostly consists of individuals who have already decided on 
being married or in free union implies that the sex ratio has already operated on 
marital status, and its effect left on fertility for this sample was insignificant. 
 
The sample consists only of household heads or their spouses. Other individuals 
in the households who might also have children are not included in the samples. 
The female sample has 2,111 individuals, and the male sample has 3,150 
individuals. Some observations are excluded because they have missing values 
in one of the explanatory variables of the model. 
 
The results of the model of fertility are included in Table 13. There, the number of 
children of a household head or his/her spouse younger than 12 is modeled as a 
function of the individual’s age and schooling, own wealth variables and social 
programs that are likely to determine fertility. 
 
The independent variables are: 
•  Age; 
•  Year  of  schooling; 
•   A dummy variable for living in a house or an apartment;
76 
•   Non-labor income (the sum of non-labor incomes that are ‘permanent’ for the 
person);
77 
•   A dummy variable =1 if the house has telephone service; 
•   The percentage of women in the “departamento” who used modern 
contraceptive methods in 1995;  
•   The percentage of children younger than 5 in the municipality that attend 
“hogares de madres comunitarias del ICBF” as the main or secondary 
childcare “activity” in the week. 
 
By looking at the fertility regressions, the model is explaining better the observed 
data for women than for men. The results show that older individuals tend to 
have fewer young children, but this is because the children included are of age 
12 or younger. Generally when looking at children of all ages, fertility increases 
with age. Education has the expected sign of reducing fertility but it is significant 
only for women under the first specification. Living in a house or an apartment 
promotes having younger children. Having telephone as a measure of wealth 
decreases fertility. The family planning program is negative and it is very 
significant, indicating that to live in a region with extended use of modern 
contraceptive methods by women reduces fertility of both men and women. 
 
The use in the municipality of the childcare program “hogares de madres 
comunitarias” provides assistance to women and seems to be related with higher 
levels of fertility. These “hogares de madres comunitarias” attend only children 
younger than 5. The causality between having young children and living in a 
municipality with more of these programs is not clear, since there may be more 
                                                           
76 Instead of living in rented rooms or squatter. 
77 This sum does not include lottery prizes or gains from sale of properties, because these types of non-labor 
income are not ‘permanent’ and therefore may be less likely to determine labor decisions of individual.  
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“hogares de madres comunitarias” because there are more children or the 
contrary. The interaction term between schooling and the program of “hogares de 
madres comunitarias” is negative for women, indicating that the even though the 
impact of the program on fertility is positive, for more educated women this effect 
is lower. The results for males and females are similar in sign and significance, 
but the coefficients of both models are statistically different. 
 
The models in (2) are used to calculate predicted values that are inserted into the 
model of equation (1) in order to see the effects of “fertility-instrumental variable” 
on the employment choice of individuals. The goal is to examine whether some 
policies that affect the fertility decision of the individuals (like childcare or family 
planning programs), as well as macroeconomic indicators (unemployment), have 




4.4 Probit model of participation in the informal sector with fertility as an 
endogenous variable 
 
The models of participation in the informal sector with the instrumental-variables 
methodology for fertility are included in Table 11, columns 3 and 4. The models 
are basically the same as the models in section 4.2, but the fertility variable has 
been replaced by its fitted values derived from the models in equation (2), 
specifications 2 and 4 of Table 13 respectively for each gender. 
 
The results show that when the variable is substituted by the fitted value from the 
fertility model, the male coefficient under Definition 2 for the effect of number of 
children on belonging to the informal sector increases in size, and particularly the 
value of the derivative is much larger. For women the instrumental-variables 
methodology produces an insignificant coefficient on the number of children 
younger than 12. A small but significant effect was observed in the specifications 
with the raw variable. For men, on the contrary, the effect is larger and more 
significant than for women: having one more child younger than 12 for a man 
increases his probability of being informal under Definition 2 by 0.52. 
 
The results of the instrumental-variables under Definition 4 do not improve much 
the observed effects without instrumental-variables. For men the effects of having 
children on being an informal worker become positive. Having one more child for 
a man increases his probability of being informal under Definition 4 by 0.18. 
However, the coefficient is only significant at the 15% level. For women, under 
this Definition, the effect is insignificant with the instrumental-variables 
methodology as well as without it. 
 
Once again Definition 2 provides models that have a better overall fit than 
Definition 4. 
 
The most interesting aspect of these results is that not only women, but also 
men, do tend to participate more in the informal sector when they have more  
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children. This may be due to the fact that they share childcare responsibilities. 
However, there is also the fact that higher fertility levels are associated with 
poverty, which is also associated with informal jobs.  
 
The result that the “number of children younger than 5 that during the most part 
of the week spend the time with one of their parents either at home or at work” is 
significant and positive only for women (Table 11 columns 1 and 3, first page) 
indicates that the childcare load seems to contribute more to female than to male 
informality. When the number of children is instrumented, the effect of the 
number of children seems to decrease for women, but the effect of the “number 
of children younger than 5 that during the most part of the week spend the time 
with one of their parents either at home or at work” is enlarged. For a woman, 
having a child who stays with her most of the time during the week, either at 
home or at work, increases her probability of being informal under Definition 2 by 
0.22. For example, having one more child who stays with her increases the 
probability of being informal from 0.52 (observed probability of being informal) to 
0.74. Under Definition 4 this variable is not significant under either specification. 
 
 
5. Models of wages and earnings in the formal and informal sectors by 
gender 
 
In this section Mincerian log hourly earnings functions are estimated separately 
for sector of employment and gender. The model to estimate is the following: 
 
log (wi ) = a + Σ  bj Xji + Σ  ck Cki  + fi  
 fi  ~ Normal(0,σ f 
2)        (3) 
 
where wi is the productivity measure (hourly earnings or wages), Xji contains only 
exogenous endowments that are not modified by the individual or family and Cki 
are reproducible forms of human capital. The parameters a,  b  and  c are 
estimated, the error term f is assumed to be zero mean independently 
distributed, i refers to individuals, and j, and k refer to the specific variables in the 
sets denoted X and C respectively. The samples include wage earners and the 
non-wage workers with positive labor earnings.   
  
The dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly wages or earnings of 
individuals.
78 The independent variables are: 
•  Age; 
•  Age  squared; 
•  Year  of  schooling; 
•   Unemployment rate in 1997 in the region
79 where the person lives. 
                                                           
78 The reported monthly earnings or wages are divided by the reported number of hours that the individuals 
usually work in a week times 4.2857. Observations with missing wages, earnings or hours are excluded.  
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Age is used as a proxy for experience since the survey does not provide a 
measure of experience.  
 
The estimation of these models is included in the first part of Table 14. In the first 
page the samples are separated according to Definition 2 and in the second page 
according to Definition 4. According to Definition 2, the highest returns to 
schooling are attained by informal women and the lowest for informal men. The 
unemployment rate decreases the wages/earnings in the formal sector, but their 
impact is not significant on informal wages/earnings. The models for the formal 
sector have a better overall fit than the models for the informal sector. The 
returns to schooling in the formal sector according to Definition 4 are 
considerably smaller than in the informal sector and also lower than the 
estimated returns to schooling under Definition 2. Under Definition 4, the highest 
returns to schooling are attained by informal women and the lowest by formal 
men. The unemployment rate has no significant effect on wages or earnings 
according to Definition 4.  
 
The coefficients for age and age squared in Table 14 depict a relationship 
between age and wages / earnings that has an inverse U shape. This curve 
reaches its maximum at different points depending on the values of the 
coefficients, at the point that individuals in the given sector and gender are 
expected to be gaining their maximum wages / earnings.  The values of those 
maximums change considerably between gender and sectors. According to 
Definition 2, the patterns of wages/earnings in the formal sector both for males 
and females reach their maximums at ages that imply retirement (74 years for 
women and 119 for men). In the informal sector the pattern of wages/earnings for 
females reaches its maximum at 54 years and for men at 43 years old. According 
to Definition 4, the estimated coefficients for age imply similar patterns. 
 
In a second step, the hourly wage/earnings equations are estimated with a 
correction for the selection bias caused by the sample selection. The sample 
selection is due to the fact that the equations are being estimated only for 
individuals in one sector. The Probit equations of section 4 predicted the choice 
of employment sector with a vector of observable socioeconomic characteristics. 
From this step the inverses Mill’s ratios (lambdas) are obtained according to the 
individual’s actual choice. These are means from truncated distributions 
measuring those unobservable characteristics that influence the employment 
choice and, potentially, the earnings performance. Those lambdas are included in 
the Mincerian earnings regressions in addition to the observable human capital 





                                                                                                                                                                             
79 Unemployment rates are calculated in the seven larger cities and extrapolated to other urban areas in 
same “departamento”. For urban areas in other “departamentos”, an average from seven largest cities is 
inputed.  
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1. Probit for specific sector participation (Selection Mechanism): 
 
zi
* = γ ’ pi + ui 
zi = 1  if  zi
* > 0 
zi = 0  if  zi
* ≤  0 
Prob(zi = 1) = Φ  (γ ’ pi) 
Prob(zi = 0) = 1- Φ  (γ ’ pi)    (4) 
 
zi = 1 when the individual i works in the informal (formal) sector, and zi = 0 when 
individual i does not work in the informal (formal) sector. Φ  is the standard normal 
cumulative distribution function, the error term u is assumed to be distributed with 
mean zero and variance one, i refers to individuals and γγγγ  are the parameters 
estimated in the Probit model. The variables pi determine the decision of 
participation in one sector or another and are exogenous to the market wage 
offer.  
 
2. Hourly earnings equation: 
 
log (wi ) = a + Σ  bj Xji + Σ  ck Cki  + fi , observed if zi = 1 
(ui , fi ) ~ Bivariate Normal(0,0,1,σ f 
2,ρ )     (5) 
 
The hourly earnings equation (5) is equal to equation (3), but it is observed only 
when the individual is a worker in the given sector. σσσσ f   is the standard deviation 
of the error term f, and ρρρρ  is the correlation coefficient between the error terms u 
and f.  The variables zi and pi are observed for a random sample of individuals, 
but log(wi ) is observed only when zi = 1. The model to estimate is: 
  
E [log(wi)| zi=1 ] = a + Σ  bj Xji + Σ  ck Cki  + ρ  σ f  λ (γ ’ pi)   (6) 
 
where λ (γ ’ pi)=ϕ ( γ ’ pi) /Φ (γ ’ pi) and ϕϕϕϕ  is the standard normal probability density 
function. 
 
The variables used to explain participation in a given sector pi proxy the 
individual’s non-labor income. When the λλλλ ’s coefficient is positive and significant, 
the unobservables that contribute to the probability of participation in one sector 
are positively associated with receiving higher market earnings, for reasons not 
accounted for in the earnings equation. When the coefficient for λλλλ  is negative and 
significant, the opposite happens. It is not obvious a priori what sign to expect for 
λλλλ .   
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The estimation of these models with the Heckman correction for selection bias 
caused by separating the sample into formal and informal sectors are included in 
the bottom of Table 14. The selection models that determine the lambdas are not 
included here, because they are equivalent to the models in specifications 1 and 
3 from Table 10. 
 
The λλλλ  determines when the sample selection was producing OLS biased results. 
When λλλλ  is not significant the sample selection problem is not significant, and the 
OLS coefficients are unbiased. In fact, the obtained coefficients under the OLS 
and Heckman specifications are very similar when λλλλ  is not significant. For the 
samples of formal women and informal males under Definition 2, the coefficient 
for λλλλ  is significant and under Definition 4 it is insignificant only for the sample of 
informal females. In all cases in which λλλλ  is significant and also positive, the 
unobservables that contribute to the probability of participation in one sector are 
positively associated with receiving higher market earnings, for reasons not 
accounted for in the earnings equation. This is the case in almost all the cases. 
This implies that individuals are choosing the sector where their unobservables 
would yield higher wages/earnings for them. Those unobservables are 
summarized in the error terms and may contain variables not accounted by the 
data. 
 
Only for formal males under Definition 4 the lambda is negative, but not very 
significant. The sign would indicate that the unobservables that contribute for a 
male to work in a firm of more than ten workers are negatively associated with 
the unobservables that contribute for him to have higher hourly wages.  
  
Once the selection bias is taken into account, the unbiased returns to schooling 
are the highest for formal males under Definition 2. Under Definition 4 the 
maximum returns to schooling are for informal females. As before, the results 
show that the unemployment rate has a negative effect only on formal wages / 
earnings under Definition 2.  
 
The age returns with the selection bias correction do not change significantly, 
except for the sample of formal females under Definition 2. For them, the age at 
which the wages/earning reaches its maximum drops from 74 years old to 53 
years old. Under Definition 4 the results remain consistent with those obtained 





This paper analyzed some aspects of the informal sector in Colombia considering 
in particular gender issues. The informal sector size depends on which definition 
is adopted. In Colombia, the size of the informal sector range is between 26% of 
workers, when the informal sector is defined as those workers without labor 
contracts or social security in health or in pensions, to 63.6% of workers, when 
the informal sector is defined as those workers who work in firms of ten or fewer  
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workers. Based on DANE´s definition,
80 the size of the sector has remained more 
or less constant in the last 15 years, as shown in López (1996) of about 55%.  
 
The various definitions of informal sector overlap each other in various ways and 
any one of them is grouping workers that are very heterogeneous in the type of 
occupation, earnings, working conditions as well as in the sector of activity. 
However, there are a list of trends that make the informal workers different from 
the formal workers, under any definition used in this paper. Although a broad set 
of definitions is used to initially describe the data, for the estimation of the models 
the paper is based in two definitions that are applicable to the data available, and 
use a different set of criteria to characterize informality. These definitions of 
informal workers are: 
•   Family workers without pay, domestic servants and self-employed workers 
excluding independent professionals.  
•   Workers not covered by any sort of social security in health, not covered by 
social security in pensions and without formal labor contracts.  
 
Very little can be said about the regulation of the informal sector in Colombia. 
The government has had the role of a promotor of the informal sector, with its 
National Plan of microenterprise development, training microentrepreneurs and 
lending resources to begin small businesses. The majority of the resources come 
from credits with international institutions (such as IABD). However, the 
relationship between the promotion of infomal small businesses and long term 
growth is not clear yet. The regulations of minumum wages and social security in 
health or in pensions are hard to apply even in the modern sector, leaving the 
informal sector basically unregulated. The only hope is that the Reform to Social 
Security, introduced in 1993, that intends to provide every individual with its rights 
to health and pensions, becomes operative and provides benefits for all the 
population, including informal workers and their families. 
 
The data for this study comes from the urban part of the Encuesta Nacional de 
Condiciones de Vida 1997 including 21,625 individuals of all ages, 55.4% of 
whom are covered by some sort of social security. From this sample, two crude 
measures of fertility were constructed, one that measures the number of children 
younger than 12 and one that measures the number of children younger than 5 
that stay most of the time at home or at work with one of their parents. The final 
sample contains only individuals 18 years old and older (13,471 individuals) that 
live in urban areas of Colombia. 
 
The descriptive analysis of the data shows a series of stylized facts about the 
informal sector in Colombia that hold under any definition of informal sector 
analyzed in this paper. Informal workers are older than formal workers and tend 
to be more from rural origins than formal workers. Their non-labor incomes are 
on average smaller, and they receive them less frequently (except for lottery 
                                                           
80 DANE’s definition includes Self-employed (excluding professionals), plus workers in own farm, 
plus domestic servants, plus unpaid family workers plus wage workers who work for firms of 10 or 
less workers.  
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rewards). They have larger families and their houses have fewer rooms for the 
family members. Informal workers are more represented among the lowest 
socioeconomic strata, live in houses and neighborhoods with less “good” 
conditions than formal workers, and tend more frequently to have family 
businesses in their own houses.  
 
Informal workers work very frequently in the house where they live or in the street 
while formal workers tend to go to their company’s offices, but the working 
conditions are more or less similar in both sectors. Informal workers spend on 
average 2 to 3 hours less at work per week than formal workers under most 
definitions of informality. This coincides with the hypothesis of this paper that 
many informal workers, specially women, belong to this sector because it is more 
convenient for their childcare and house care needs. This also contradicts the 
findings of other studies (López (1996)) that report that in the informal sector the 
working schedule is larger than in the formal sector. 
 
The most important differences between both sectors are found in human capital 
endowments and in labor wages or earnings. Workers for large firms have on 
average 3.3 more years of schooling than workers for firms with ten or fewer 
workers. Hourly wages are considerably higher for formal workers and the 
differences in hourly earnings are even higher. When the informal sector is 
defined as workers self employed excluding professionals, domestic servants 
and unpaid family workers, mean hourly wages in the informal sector are 29% of 
mean hourly wages in the formal sector, and mean hourly earnings in the 
informal sector are 27% of mean hourly earnings in the formal sector. When the 
informal sector is defined as those workers who work in firms of size 10 or less, 
hourly wages in the informal sector are on average 45% of hourly wages in the 
formal sector, and hourly earnings in the informal sector are on average 36% of 
hourly earnings in the formal sector.  
 
The differences across sectors and by gender have also been described. 
Informal women are less in the lower strata than informal men, and have slightly 
better housing characteristics than informal men. They also tend to be covered 
by social security more often. More informal women have a family business in the 
household.  Women in the informal sector tend to work in their own home more 
often than informal men. Among the informal, men and women have similar 
education levels and informal men are on average 2 years older than informal 
women. A large difference between informal men and women is that informal 
women tend to work on average between 6 and 11 hours less per week than 
informal men. Informal women gain lower hourly wages and earnings than 
informal men. With most of the definitions or informal sector, the gender gap in 
wages or earnings is not as large as in the formal sector, but the size of the gap 
varies highly between definitions. 
 
The choice of participation in the informal labor market has been modeled as a 
result of socioeconomic and environmental characteristics of the individual. When 
informals are defined as family workers without pay, domestic servants and self-
employed workers excluding independent professionals, for both male and  
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female samples, older individuals tend to participate in the informal sector more 
than younger individuals. For men, however, age is more of a determinant of 
participation than for women. Also for both genders, higher wealth indicators as 
well as more years of schooling decrease the probability of being in the informal 
sector. For women one more year of education represents a significantly higher 
decrease in the probability of being informal than for men. For both genders the 
unemployment rate in the place where the individual resides has a large effect on 
the likelihood of being informal, higher for women than for men. This may be 
because in periods of low employment it is easier for women to take jobs as 
domestic servants than for men. The models with this definition have a better 
overall fit than the models with the informal sector defined by lack of social 
security coverage or labor contracts. This means that, although the informal 
sector is highly heterogeneous, the group of self-employed, domestic servants 
and unpaid family workers constitutes a more homogeneous population than the 
group of workers lacking social security or labor contracts. With this latter 
definition the unemployment rate has no significant impact on the likelihood of 
being informal.  
 
Looking at the effects of fertility on the probability of being informal, it is found 
that having one more child increases the woman’s probability of being informal by 
0.03. This variable also has a positive effect on the man’s probability of being 
informal, increasing it by 0.02. However, taking care of the children during most 
of the week at home or at work increases the female’s probability of belonging to 
the informal sector by 0.19 per child, whereas for men this variable is not 
significant. The children variables are not significant when the definition of 
informal sector by lack of social security coverage or labor contracts is used. This 
implies that fertility and childcare have an effect on an individuals decision to 
become self-employed, domestic servant of unpaid family worker, but not 
necessarily on the decision to take jobs lacking social security or labor contracts. 
 
A further step takes into account that fertility might not be an exogenous variable, 
but that it is another decision of the family, that can be altered by socioeconomic 
characteristics as well as by environmental factors. A series of data on family 
planning programs at the time of the survey and 10 years prior to it were 
collected from other sources different than the survey. The survey of 1997 was 
also used to summarize data on social programs of childcare at the municipality 
level. These environmental factors were used as instruments for fertility. The 
fertility regressions show that more education and wealth reduce fertility and the 
family planning program effect is negative and it is very significant, indicating that 
to live in a region with extended use of modern contraceptive methods by women 
reduces fertility of both men and women. These models are used to calculate 
predicted values that are inserted into the model of employment choice of 
individuals in order to see the effects of “fertility-instrumental variable”. The most 
interesting aspect of these results is that not only women but also men tend to 
participate more in the informal sector when they have more children younger 
than 12. The most relevant variable for women is the “number of children 
younger than 5 that during the most part of the week spend the time with one of 
their parents either at home or at work”. It is significant and positive only for  
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women indicating that the childcare load contributes more to female than to male 
informality, confirming the hypothesis of this paper. When the number of children 
is instrumented, the effect of this variable is enlarged. For a woman, having a 
child who stays with her most of the time during the week, either at home or at 
work, increases her probability of being informal by 0.22. For example, having 
one more child who stays with her increases the probability of being informal 
from 0.52 (observed probability of being informal) to 0.74. This result holds under 
the definition of informal employment as family workers without pay, domestic 
servants and self-employed workers excluding independent professionals. Under 
the definition based on lack of social security or labor contracts this variable is 
not significant in either specification. 
 
The paper also estimated models of log hourly wages/earnings separately by 
gender and by sector of employment. According to the definition of informal 
employment as family workers without pay, domestic servants and self-employed 
workers excluding independent professionals, the unemployment rate decreases 
the wages/earnings in the formal sector, but its impact is not significant on 
informal wages/earnings. The unemployment rate has no effect on wages or 
earnings according to the other definition. The results on schooling returns 
change between definitions. In a second step, the hourly wage/earnings 
equations are estimated with a correction for the selection bias caused by the 
fact that the equations are being estimated only for individuals in one sector, 
without consideration of the choice of that sector.  
 
The Probit equations that predicted the choice of employment sector with a 
vector of observable socioeconomic characteristics are used to compute the 
inverses Mill’s ratios (lambda). Those lambdas are included in Mincerian 
earnings regressions in addition to the observable human capital and 
socioeconomic characteristics. λλλλ  is significant in most cases and it is also 
positive, meaning that the unobservables that contribute to the probability of 
participation in one sector are positively associated with receiving higher market 
earnings, for reasons not accounted for in the earnings equation. This implies 
that individuals are choosing the sector where their unobservables would yield 
higher wages/earnings for them. Those unobservables are summarized in the 
error terms and may contain variables not accounted by the data. 
 
Once the selection bias is taken into account, the unbiased returns to schooling 
are the highest for formal females (27%) under the definition of informal 
employment as family workers without pay, domestic servants and self-employed 
workers excluding independent professionals. Under the definition of informality 
as lack of social security or labor contracts, the maximum returns to schooling 
are for informal females (25%). As before, the results show that the 
unemployment rate has a negative effect on formal wages / earnings only under 
the definition of informal employment as family workers without pay, domestic 
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Descriptive statistics of main characteristics of whole sample aged 18 and older
out of labor force unemployed workers
individual characteristics
Variables Variable name Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
observations 4154 1089 8228
gender (male=1, female=0) genero 0,22 0,4 0,43 0,5 0,57 0,5
age e02 46,47 20,3 30,58 12,1 37,06 12,7
born in rural areas=1, 0 otherwise e013a 0,15 0,4 0,11 0,3 0,13 0,3
marital status %
free union=1, 0 otherwise free union 19,69 21,67 25,26
married =1, 0 otherwise married 35,03 19,47 34,37
widows=1, 0 otherwise widows 14,47 1,38 2,82
separated=1, 0 otherwise separated 7,46 9,83 9,81
single=1, 0 otherwise single 23,35 47,66 27,75
monthly non-labor income
receives pensions=1, 0 otherwise j46a 0,11 0,3 0,02 0,1 0,02 0,1
pension amount ja46b 43755 198415 9777 126758 8729 79577
receives alimony=1, 0 otherwise j47a 0,03 0,2 0,04 0,2 0,03 0,2
alimony amount ja47b 4124 39150 4188 24843 2910 28289
receives interests=1, 0 otherwise j48a 0,02 0,1 0,02 0,1 0,02 0,1
interests amount ja48ba 7448 237923 2063 33743 4054 67710
receive monetary help=1, 0 otherwise j49a 0,16 0,4 0,15 0,4 0,05 0,2
monetary help amount ja49ba 10536 54382 7241 30875 2727 33158
rents property=1, 0 otherwise j50a 0,09 0,3 0,03 0,2 0,06 0,2
rents earnings ja50ba 12046 86328 2616 22144 6743 59597
sold property last 12 months=1, 0 otherwise j51a 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,02 0,1
sold property amount ja51ba 22135 738425 1307 30642 12536 313088
won lottery last 12 months=1, 0 otherwise j56a 0,01 0,1 0,03 0,2 0,03 0,2
lottery winnings amount ja56ba 280 4158 617 6440 964 11270
Table continues next page 
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Table 3 - continuation out of labor force unemployed workers
Variable Variable name Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
household characteristics
household size perhoga 4,75 2,3 5,25 2,5 4,68 2,2
#rooms/#persons hacina 1,02 0,8 0,78 0,5 0,93 0,6
observations 2756 464 5519
children younger than 12 ninme (1) 0,65 1,0 1,01 1,0 0,94 1,1
children younger than 5 ni5 0,27 0,6 0,45 0,7 0,35 0,6
estrato de energia %
estrato de energia 0 0 3,22 3,59 3,75
estrato de energía 1 to 3 1-3 82,7 86,38 81,72
estrato de energía 4 to 6 4-6 12,94 9,01 12,88
estrato de energía 9 (not available?) 9 1,14 1,01 1,66
housing characteristics
fixed structure (walls)=1, 0 otherwise b02 0,86 0,3 0,88 0,3 0,88 0,3
garage=1, 0 otherwise b0603 0,16 0,4 0,13 0,3 0,17 0,4
yard=1, 0 otherwise b0605 0,06 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,07 0,3
electricity=1, 0 otherwise c03 0,99 0,1 1,00 0,1 1,00 0,1
pays electricity=1, 0 otherwise c04 (2) 0,94 0,2 0,92 0,3 0,94 0,2
own separate kitchen=1, 0 otherwise c07 0,86 0,4 0,81 0,4 0,82 0,4
owner occupied housing=1, 0 otherwise d01 0,68 0,5 0,59 0,5 0,58 0,5
running water connection=1, 0 otherwise c11 0,96 0,2 0,96 0,2 0,94 0,2
pays for water=1, 0 otherwise c23 (2) 0,93 0,3 0,92 0,3 0,93 0,3
running water inside house =1, 0 otherwise c13 (2) 0,93 0,3 0,89 0,3 0,93 0,3
toilet- sewage=1, 0 otherwise c17 0,95 0,2 0,94 0,2 0,96 0,2
trash collected=1, 0 otherwise c22 0,92 0,3 0,92 0,3 0,93 0,2
telephone=1, 0 otherwise c29 0,62 0,5 0,56 0,5 0,62 0,5
refrigerator=1, 0 otherwise k2001 0,79 0,4 0,74 0,4 0,80 0,4
color t.v.=1, 0 otherwise k2005 0,81 0,4 0,79 0,4 0,83 0,4
car =1, 0 otherwise k2009 0,15 0,4 0,09 0,3 0,17 0,4
washing machine=1, 0 otherwise k2016 0,27 0,4 0,21 0,4 0,28 0,4
personal computer=1, 0 otherwise k2020 0,05 0,2 0,04 0,2 0,07 0,2
Table continues next page 
  41
 
T a b l e3-c o n t i n u a t i o n o u to fl a b o rf o r c e u n e m p l o y e d w o r k e r s
Variable Variable name Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
neighborhood characteristics
clean municipal running water=1, 0 otherwise u07 0,79 0,4 0,75 0,4 0,78 0,4
no interruptions running water=1, 0 otherwise u0601 0,91 0,3 0,93 0,3 0,90 0,3
running water in majority of houses =1, 0 otherwise u04 0,28 0,5 0,28 0,5 0,29 0,5
no sewage related problems =1, 0 otherwise u09 0,49 0,5 0,48 0,5 0,50 0,5
no natural disasters=1, 0 otherwise u10 0,32 0,5 0,31 0,5 0,33 0,5
health center=1, 0 otherwise u1101 0,76 0,4 0,80 0,4 0,75 0,4
child care facilities=1, 0 otherwise u1102 0,07 0,3 0,09 0,3 0,07 0,2
kindergarten=1, 0 otherwise u1103 0,04 0,2 0,04 0,2 0,04 0,2
primary schools=1, 0 otherwise u1104 0,52 0,5 0,52 0,5 0,51 0,5
escuela nueva (PILOT school?)=1, 0 otherwise u1106 0,34 0,5 0,35 0,5 0,32 0,5
secondary schools=1, 0 otherwise u1107 0,56 0,5 0,56 0,5 0,57 0,5
sports arenas=1, 0 otherwise u1110 0,05 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,05 0,2
children park=1, 0 otherwise u1111 0,37 0,5 0,45 0,5 0,40 0,5
public phones=1, 0 otherwise u1112 0,06 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,06 0,2
street night lights=1, 0 otherwise u1116 0,46 0,5 0,42 0,5 0,48 0,5
street cleaning=1, 0 otherwise u1201 0,55 0,5 0,51 0,5 0,52 0,5
paved streets=1, 0 otherwise u13 0,83 0,4 0,82 0,4 0,83 0,4
parks=1, 0 otherwise u17 0,53 0,5 0,58 0,5 0,55 0,5
social assistance=1, 0 otherwise u26 0,05 0,2 0,05 0,2 0,06 0,2
infrastructure works in last 5 y.=1, 0 otherwise u30 0,14 0,4 0,16 0,4 0,16 0,4
family business in household
family business on household=1, 0 otherwise o01_4 0,10 0,3 0,09 0,3 0,19 0,4
observations 401 103 1525
size family business o09 (3) 1,75 1,3 1,70 1,1 2,00 1,5
self-consumption household=1, 0 otherwise o15 0,37 0,5 0,47 0,5 0,48 0,5
pays social security workers=1, 0 otherwise o18 0,02 0,2 0,01 0,1 0,03 0,2
pays taxes from business=1, 0 otherwise o20 0,26 0,4 0,12 0,3 0,29 0,5
Table continues next page 
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Table 3 - continuation out of labor force unemployed workers
Variable Variable name Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
human capital characteristics
years of schooling educa (4) 5,53 3,9 7,95 3,9 8,08 4,5
missing educa 0,11 0,14 0,08
knows read & write=1, 0 otherwise h001 0,89 0,3 0,97 0,2 0,96 0,2
training courses last 12m=1, 0 otherwise i001 0,04 0,2 0,14 0,3 0,20 0,4
technical education=1, 0 otherwise tecnic 0,01 0,1 0,03 0,2 0,04 0,2
covered social insurance health=1, 0 otherwise f001 0,62 0,5 0,41 0,5 0,65 0,5
health status very good=1, 0 otherwise f009 0,09 0,3 0,12 0,3 0,15 0,4
chronic diseases=1, 0 otherwise f015 0,27 0,4 0,10 0,3 0,12 0,3
work characteristics (5)
observations
receives wages or earnings=1, 0 otherwise cond3 -- -- 0,98 0,2
fondo de pensiones=1, 0 otherwise j40a -- -- 0,33 0,5
pays retencion fuente=1, 0 otherwise j34 -- -- 0,06 0,2
size of firm =<10 j35a -- -- 0,64 0,5
weekly hours of work last week horas -- -- 47,12 20,0
normal weekly hours of work horas1 -- -- 47,70 19,3
has a labor contract=1, 0 otherwise j18c -- -- 0,48 0,5
labor contracts -- --
observations -- -- 3982
fixed term contracts=1, 0 otherwise j18a (7) -- -- 0,19 0,4
no prestaciones or salario integral=1, 0 otherwise j20a -- -- 0,24 0,4
afiliado ARP=1, 0 otherwise j21a -- -- 0,33 0,5
subsidy for food, transp. or housing=1, 0 otherwise j23_25 -- -- 0,52 0,5
bonus or primas=1, 0 otherwise j28 -- -- 0,69 0,5
observations -- -- 743
contract for more than 6 months=1, 0 otherwise j18b (8) -- -- 0,59 0,5
Table continues next page 
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Table 3 - continuation out of labor force unemployed workers
Variable Variable name Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
wages and earnings -- --
observations -- -- 4583
monthly wages salmes (9) -- -- 388635 547710
observations -- -- 4581
hourly wages j29h (10) -- -- 2158,51 3177,5
observations -- -- 3454
monthly earnings j33m (11) -- -- 266489 579579
observations -- -- 3446
hourly earnings j33mh -- -- 1713,74 5583,7
working conditions (5)
extreme physical or intelectual effort =1, 0 otherwise j36_1 -- -- 0,18 0,4
noises - vibrations=1, 0 otherwise j36_3 -- -- 0,06 0,2
bad lighting and air quality=1, 0 otherwise j36_6 -- -- 0,01 0,1
insect bites=1, 0 otherwise j36_7 -- -- 0,02 0,1
weather changes=1, 0 otherwise j36_8 -- -- 0,03 0,2
psicological pressure=1, 0 otherwise j36_9 -- -- 0,04 0,2
no problems (A)=1, 0 otherwise j36_10 -- -- 0,54 0,5
work place % (5)
company office j37_1 -- -- 0,44 0,5
own office outside home j37_2 -- -- 0,07 0,3
home office j37_3 -- -- 0,14 0,4
office in another home j37_4 -- -- 0,08 0,3
street merchant (ambulante) j37_5 -- -- 0,08 0,3
street merchant (estacionario) j37_6 -- -- 0,02 0,1
kiosk j37_7 -- -- 0,01 0,1
door to door j37_8 -- -- 0,01 0,1
in car or truck j37_9 -- -- 0,06 0,2
construction j37_11 -- -- 0,04 0,2
farm owned or rented j37_12 -- -- 0,02 0,1
another person farm j37_13 -- -- 0,03 0,2
work accidents in life=1, 0 otherwise j43a -- -- 0,14 0,4
secondary job?=1, 0 otherwise j44 -- -- 0,10 0,3
Table continues next page 
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Table 3 - continuation out of labor force unemployed workers
Variable Variable name Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
observations 0 0 7040
commuting minutes to work j39a (6) -- -- 27,55 29,6
occupation position % (5)
worker in private firm j17=1 -- -- 39,9
worker government j17=2 -- -- 8,5
daily paid worker j17=3 -- -- 2,77
domestic servant j17=4 -- -- 4,59
independent professional j17=5 -- -- 1,08
self-employed j17=6 -- -- 35,49
employer - manager j17=7 -- -- 4,36
works own farm j17=8 -- -- 1,05
unpaid family worker j17=9 -- -- 2,26
sector of activity % (5)
industry rama3 -- -- 0,16
construction rama5 -- -- 0,06
retail rama6 -- -- 0,26
services rama9 -- -- 0,32
other sectors other sec. -- -- 0,19
(A) means none of the above + no deficient security+ no extreme temperatures.
These aspects were excluded from table because present no differences between categories.
Notes:
(1) only those individuals that are heads of household or spouses (8) of those who have fixed term contracts
(2) percentage relative to those who have the service (9) those who report wages
(3) including only those households that do have family business (10) those who report wages and hours
(4) mean calculated only for those with variable not missing (11) those who report earnings
(5) only for workers Monetary figures in colombian pesos of 1997
(6) mean only for those who report commuting time to work







Descriptive statistics of main charactersitics of samples 4 definitions of informal sector
self-employed (excludes professional)
Formal Informal Formal Informal
individual characteristics
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
observations 4658 3570 5222 3006
% Informal 43% 37%
genero 0,59 0,5 0,53 0,5 0,54 0,5 0,61 0,5
e02 35,11 11,5 39,60 13,7 35,08 11,7 40,50 13,6
e013a 0,11 0,3 0,15 0,4 0,12 0,3 0,15 0,4
marital status %
free union 23,01 28,18 22,52 30,01
married 35,53 32,86 33,88 35,23
widows 1,82 4,12 1,99 4,26
separated 8,52 11,48 9,17 10,91
single 31,11 23,36 32,44 19,59
monthly non-labor income
j46a 0,02 0,1 0,02 0,2 0,02 0,1 0,03 0,2
ja46b 9138 90390 8196 62734 8379 85733 9338 67571
j47a 0,03 0,2 0,02 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,02 0,1
ja47b 3249 31624 2467 23224 3162 30783 2472 23327
j48a 0,03 0,2 0,01 0,1 0,03 0,2 0,02 0,1
ja48ba 5160 59746 2610 76855 4658 56525 3005 83658
j49a 0,04 0,2 0,07 0,3 0,05 0,2 0,07 0,2
ja49ba 2897 40606 2505 19565 2850 38748 2513 20035
j50a 0,06 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,06 0,2
ja50ba 8246 69898 4781 42491 7498 66162 5431 46000
j51a 0,01 0,1 0,02 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,02 0,1
ja51ba 14234 390662 10321 163732 12773 368994 12124 178338
j56a 0,03 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,03 0,2
ja56ba 888 10444 1064 12265 822 9895 1211 13324
household characteristics
perhoga 4,62 2,1 4,76 2,3 4,67 2,1 4,70 2,2
hacina 0,96 0,6 0,90 0,6 0,95 0,6 0,90 0,7
observations 3007 2512 3267 2252
ninme (1) 0,96 1,0 0,92 1,1 0,95 1,0 0,93 1,1
ni5 0,38 0,6 0,32 0,6 0,37 0,6 0,32 0,6
estrato de energia %
0 2,49 5,40 2,91 5,21
1-3 80,06 83,90 79,20 86,20
4-6 15,82 9,03 16,20 7,10
9 1,63 1,69 1,74 1,50
Table continues next page
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Table 4 - continuation
self-employed-domestic serv.-family work.without pay self-employed (excludes professional)
Formal Informal Formal Informal
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
housing characteristics
b02 0,90 0,3 0,86 0,3 0,90 0,3 0,86 0,3
b0603 0,19 0,4 0,13 0,3 0,19 0,4 0,12 0,3
b0605 0,09 0,3 0,05 0,2 0,09 0,3 0,04 0,2
c03 1,00 0,0 0,99 0,1 1,00 0,0 0,99 0,1
c04 (2) 0,95 0,2 0,92 0,3 0,95 0,2 0,92 0,3
c07 0,84 0,4 0,80 0,4 0,84 0,4 0,80 0,4
d01 0,58 0,5 0,59 0,5 0,58 0,5 0,58 0,5
c11 0,94 0,2 0,94 0,2 0,94 0,2 0,94 0,2
c23 (2) 0,94 0,2 0,91 0,3 0,94 0,2 0,91 0,3
c13 (2) 0,95 0,2 0,91 0,3 0,94 0,2 0,90 0,3
c17 0,97 0,2 0,94 0,2 0,97 0,2 0,93 0,2
c22 0,94 0,2 0,92 0,3 0,94 0,2 0,91 0,3
c29 0,68 0,5 0,54 0,5 0,67 0,5 0,53 0,5
k2001 0,83 0,4 0,75 0,4 0,82 0,4 0,75 0,4
k2005 0,88 0,3 0,78 0,4 0,87 0,3 0,77 0,4
k2009 0,19 0,4 0,15 0,4 0,19 0,4 0,13 0,3
k2016 0,32 0,5 0,21 0,4 0,32 0,5 0,20 0,4
k2020 0,09 0,3 0,04 0,2 0,09 0,3 0,03 0,2
neighborhood characteristics
u07 0,80 0,4 0,76 0,4 0,80 0,4 0,76 0,4
u0601 0,92 0,3 0,89 0,3 0,92 0,3 0,88 0,3
u04 0,29 0,5 0,29 0,5 0,29 0,5 0,29 0,5
u09 0,51 0,5 0,48 0,5 0,51 0,5 0,47 0,5
u10 0,32 0,5 0,35 0,5 0,32 0,5 0,34 0,5
u1101 0,75 0,4 0,75 0,4 0,75 0,4 0,76 0,4
u1102 0,07 0,3 0,06 0,2 0,07 0,3 0,06 0,2
u1103 0,04 0,2 0,04 0,2 0,04 0,2 0,04 0,2
u1104 0,52 0,5 0,49 0,5 0,52 0,5 0,49 0,5
u1106 0,30 0,5 0,34 0,5 0,30 0,5 0,35 0,5
u1107 0,58 0,5 0,55 0,5 0,58 0,5 0,55 0,5
u1110 0,04 0,2 0,05 0,2 0,04 0,2 0,05 0,2
u1111 0,41 0,5 0,39 0,5 0,41 0,5 0,39 0,5
u1112 0,06 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,06 0,2
u1116 0,52 0,5 0,43 0,5 0,51 0,5 0,42 0,5
u1201 0,54 0,5 0,49 0,5 0,54 0,5 0,48 0,5
u13 0,85 0,4 0,80 0,4 0,84 0,4 0,80 0,4
u17 0,55 0,5 0,55 0,5 0,55 0,5 0,54 0,5
u26 0,06 0,2 0,07 0,3 0,06 0,2 0,08 0,3
u30 0,15 0,4 0,17 0,4 0,15 0,4 0,17 0,4





Table 4 - continuation
self-employed-domestic serv.-family work.without pay self-employed (excludes professional)
Formal Informal Formal Informal
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
family business in household
o01_4 0,11 0,3 0,28 0,5 0,12 0,3 0,29 0,5
observations 514 1011 641 884
o09 (3) 2,21 1,8 1,90 1,4 2,35 1,8 1,75 1,3
o15 0,44 0,5 0,50 0,5 0,46 0,5 0,50 0,5
o18 0,05 0,2 0,01 0,1 0,04 0,2 0,01 0,1
o20 0,29 0,5 0,28 0,5 0,32 0,5 0,26 0,4
human capital characteristics
educa (4) 9,43 4,5 6,41 3,9 9,00 4,6 6,59 3,9
missing educa 0,10 0,05 0,10
h001 0,98 0,1 0,94 0,2 0,97 0,2 0,94 0,2
i001 0,28 0,5 0,09 0,3 0,26 0,4 0,10 0,3
tecnic 0,05 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,05 0,2 0,03 0,2
f001 0,79 0,4 0,48 0,5 0,75 0,4 0,48 0,5
f009 0,19 0,4 0,11 0,3 0,18 0,4 0,11 0,3
f015 0,10 0,3 0,13 0,3 0,11 0,3 0,13 0,3
work characteristics (5)
observations 4658 3570 5222 3006
cond3 1,00 0,0 0,95 0,2 0,96 0,2 1,00 0,0
j40a 0,53 0,5 0,06 0,2 0,48 0,5 0,06 0,2
j34 0,08 0,3 0,04 0,2 0,08 0,3 0,04 0,2
j35a 0,39 0,5 0,95 0,2 0,46 0,5 0,95 0,2
horas 48,53 17,1 45,28 23,0 48,65 17,7 44,44 23,1
horas1 48,77 16,5 46,30 22,3 48,93 17,2 45,57 22,4
j18c 0,85 0,4 0,00 0,0 0,76 0,4 0,00 0,0
labor contracts
observations 3982 0 3982 0
j18a (7) 0,19 0,4 -- 0,19 0,4 -- --
j20a 0,24 0,4 -- 0,24 0,4 -- --
j21a 0,33 0,5 -- 0,33 0,5 -- --
j23_25 0,52 0,5 -- 0,52 0,5 -- --
j28 0,69 0,5 -- 0,69 0,5 -- --
observations 743,00 743,00 0
j18b (8) 0,59 0,5 -- 0,59 0,5 -- --
wages and earnings
observations 4205 378 4583 0
salmes (9) 414087 564595 105494 61140 388635 547710 -- --
observations 4203 378 4581 0
j29h (10) 2292,00 3269,8 674 1041 2158,51 3177,5 -- --
observations 448 3006 448 (12) 3006
j33m (11) 765911 1333878 192058 280356 765911 1333878 192058 280356
observations 448,00 2998 448,00 2998
j33mh 4673,40 12742,4 1271,48 3180,6 4673,40 12742,4 1271,48 3180,6




self-employed-domestic serv.-family work.without pay self-employed (excludes professional)
Formal Informal Formal Informal
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
working conditions (5)
j36_1 0,16 0,4 0,20 0,4 0,16 0,4 0,21 0,4
j36_3 0,07 0,3 0,04 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,05 0,2
j36_6 0,02 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1
j36_7 0,02 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,02 0,1 0,02 0,1
j36_8 0,03 0,2 0,04 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,04 0,2
j36_9 0,04 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,04 0,2 0,03 0,2
j36_10 0,53 0,5 0,55 0,5 0,55 0,5 0,52 0,5
work place (5)
j37_1 0,71 0,5 0,10 0,3 0,64 0,5 0,11 0,3
j37_2 0,05 0,2 0,09 0,3 0,05 0,2 0,11 0,3
j37_3 0,03 0,2 0,30 0,5 0,07 0,3 0,27 0,4
j37_4 0,02 0,1 0,16 0,4 0,06 0,2 0,11 0,3
j37_5 0,05 0,2 0,11 0,3 0,04 0,2 0,13 0,3
j37_6 0,01 0,1 0,04 0,2 0,01 0,1 0,04 0,2
j37_7 0,00 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,00 0,1 0,01 0,1
j37_8 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,02 0,1
j37_9 0,04 0,2 0,07 0,3 0,04 0,2 0,08 0,3
j37_11 0,03 0,2 0,05 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,06 0,2
j37_12 0,00 0,1 0,03 0,2 0,00 0,1 0,04 0,2
j37_13 0,05 0,2 0,01 0,1 0,04 0,2 0,01 0,1
j43a 0,14 0,3 0,14 0,4 0,13 0,3 0,16 0,4
j44 0,11 0,3 0,09 0,3 0,10 0,3 0,10 0,3
observations 4534 2506 4854 2186
j39a (6) 28,47 29,0 25,90 30,6 28,24 28,9 26,03 31,1
occupation position % (5)
j17=1 70,48 -- 62,87 --
j17=2 15,01 -- 13,39 --
j17=3 4,89 -- 4,37 --
j17=4 -- 10,59 7,24 --
j17=5 1,91 -- 1,7 --
j17=6 -- 81,79 -- 97,14
j17=7 7,71 -- 6,87 --
j17=8 -- 2,41 -- 2,86
j17=9 -- 5,21 3,56 --
sector of activity % (5)
rama3 18,23 13,33 16,85 14,80
rama5 4,85 7,96 4,33 9,45
rama6 22,74 30,98 22,65 32,67
rama9 31,26 32,72 35,37 25,85
other sector 22,93 15,01 20,80 17,23
Notes:
(1) only those individuals that are heads of household or spouses
(2) percentage relative to those who have the service
(3) including only those households that do have family business
(4) mean calculated only for those with variable not missing
(5) only for workers
(6) mean only for those who report commuting time to work
(7) of those who have contracts
(8) of those who have fixed term contracts
(9) those who report wages
(10) those who report wages and hours
(11) those who report earnings
Monetary figures are in colombian pesos of 1997
(12) those are patrons or independent professionals





Table 4 - continuation
Descriptive statistics of main charactersitics of samples 4 definitions of informal sector
size of firm =<10
Formal Informal Formal Informal
individual characteristics
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
observations 2996 5232 6087 2141
% Informal 64% 26%
genero 0,57 0,5 0,56 0,5 0,56 0,5 0,60 0,5
e02 35,21 10,7 38,11 13,6 36,64 12,3 38,23 13,6
e013a 0,10 0,3 0,15 0,4 0,12 0,3 0,16 0,4
marital status %
free union 20,76 27,83 23,49 30,27
married 38,85 31,80 37,51 25,46
widows 1,94 3,33 2,53 3,64
separated 8,51 10,55 8,95 12,24
single 29,94 26,49 27,52 28,40
monthly non-labor income
j46a 0,02 0,1 0,02 0,1 0,03 0,2 0,00 0,0
ja46b 9368 86862 8364 75094 11596 91807 579 16871
j47a 0,04 0,2 0,02 0,1 0,03 0,2 0,02 0,1
ja47b 3407 29050 2625 27842 3143 29593 2248 24194
j48a 0,03 0,2 0,02 0,1 0,03 0,2 0,01 0,1
ja48ba 4774 42803 3641 78492 5085 78090 1122 16458
j49a 0,04 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,05 0,2 0,07 0,3
ja49ba 2715 30153 2734 34765 2664 36411 2907 21361
j50a 0,07 0,3 0,05 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,05 0,2
ja50ba 8100 51803 5966 63624 8102 68213 2880 20041
j51a 0,02 0,1 0,02 0,1 0,02 0,1 0,01 0,1
ja51ba 7626 116362 15347 382613 14042 349973 8255 168797
j56a 0,03 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,03 0,2
ja56ba 767 7738 1077 12862 944 10998 1023 12012
household characteristics
perhoga 4,54 2,0 4,76 2,3 4,63 2,1 4,82 2,4
hacina 1,00 0,6 0,89 0,6 0,96 0,6 0,86 0,7
observations 1972 3547 4138 1381
ninme 0,95 1,0 0,94 1,1 0,95 1,1 0,90 1,1
ni5 0,37 0,6 0,34 0,6 0,37 0,6 0,31 0,6
estrato de energia %
0 3,00 4,18 3,04 5,77
1-3 78,97 83,30 80,77 84,42
4-6 16,69 10,68 14,63 7,88
9 1,34 1,84 1,56 1,92
Table continues next page
no (social security in health or in pensions










T a b l e4-c o n t i n u a t i o n
size of firm =<10 no social security in health pensions or labor contracts
Formal Informal Formal Informal
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
* housing characteristics
b02 0,92 0,3 0,86 0,3 0,90 0,3 0,84 0,4
b0603 0,20 0,4 0,14 0,4 0,19 0,4 0,11 0,3
b0605 0,10 0,3 0,06 0,2 0,08 0,3 0,05 0,2
c03 1,00 0,0 0,99 0,1 1,00 0,0 0,99 0,1
c04 0,95 0,2 0,93 0,3 0,95 0,2 0,91 0,3
c07 0,86 0,3 0,81 0,4 0,84 0,4 0,77 0,4
d01 0,60 0,5 0,57 0,5 0,58 0,5 0,57 0,5
c11 0,95 0,2 0,94 0,2 0,94 0,2 0,94 0,2
c23 0,94 0,2 0,92 0,3 0,94 0,2 0,89 0,3
c13 0,95 0,2 0,92 0,3 0,94 0,2 0,89 0,3
c17 0,97 0,2 0,94 0,2 0,97 0,2 0,92 0,3
c22 0,95 0,2 0,92 0,3 0,94 0,2 0,91 0,3
c29 0,73 0,4 0,56 0,5 0,67 0,5 0,48 0,5
k2001 0,87 0,3 0,75 0,4 0,83 0,4 0,71 0,5
k2005 0,91 0,3 0,79 0,4 0,87 0,3 0,73 0,4
k2009 0,20 0,4 0,15 0,4 0,19 0,4 0,11 0,3
k2016 0,36 0,5 0,22 0,4 0,31 0,5 0,16 0,4
k2020 0,09 0,3 0,05 0,2 0,08 0,3 0,03 0,2
* neighborhood characteristics
u07 0,79 0,4 0,78 0,4 0,79 0,4 0,75 0,4
u0601 0,92 0,3 0,90 0,3 0,91 0,3 0,89 0,3
u04 0,29 0,5 0,29 0,5 0,29 0,5 0,29 0,5
u09 0,52 0,5 0,48 0,5 0,51 0,5 0,47 0,5
u10 0,32 0,5 0,34 0,5 0,33 0,5 0,33 0,5
u1101 0,75 0,4 0,75 0,4 0,75 0,4 0,76 0,4
u1102 0,07 0,3 0,06 0,2 0,07 0,3 0,06 0,2
u1103 0,03 0,2 0,04 0,2 0,04 0,2 0,04 0,2
u1104 0,52 0,5 0,50 0,5 0,51 0,5 0,49 0,5
u1106 0,29 0,5 0,33 0,5 0,30 0,5 0,35 0,5
u1107 0,59 0,5 0,56 0,5 0,58 0,5 0,54 0,5
u1110 0,04 0,2 0,05 0,2 0,05 0,2 0,05 0,2
u1111 0,42 0,5 0,39 0,5 0,42 0,5 0,36 0,5
u1112 0,05 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,06 0,2
u1116 0,52 0,5 0,46 0,5 0,50 0,5 0,42 0,5
u1201 0,55 0,5 0,50 0,5 0,53 0,5 0,50 0,5
u13 0,84 0,4 0,82 0,4 0,83 0,4 0,81 0,4
u17 0,56 0,5 0,55 0,5 0,55 0,5 0,56 0,5
u26 0,06 0,2 0,07 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,06 0,2
u30 0,14 0,3 0,17 0,4 0,16 0,4 0,17 0,4




Table 4 - continuation
size of firm =<10 no social security in health pensions or labor contracts
Formal Informal Formal Informal
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
* family business in household
o01_4 0,08 0,3 0,25 0,4 0,16 0,4 0,27 0,4
observations 238 1287 945 580
o09 1,84 1,8 2,03 1,5 1,99 1,6 2,02 1,5
o15 0,42 0,5 0,49 0,5 0,49 0,5 0,47 0,5
o18 0,03 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,04 0,2 0,01 0,1
o20 0,21 0,4 0,30 0,5 0,28 0,5 0,29 0,5
* human capital charactersitics
educa 10,22 4,4 6,94 4,1 8,79 4,5 6,15 3,8
education missing 0,12 0,05 0,09
h001 0,99 0,1 0,94 0,2 0,97 0,2 0,92 0,3
i001 0,37 0,5 0,11 0,3 0,25 0,4 0,07 0,3
tecnic 0,06 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,05 0,2 0,02 0,1
f001 0,89 0,3 0,52 0,5 0,88 0,3 0,00 0,0
f009 0,20 0,4 0,13 0,3 0,17 0,4 0,11 0,3
f015 0,10 0,3 0,12 0,3 0,12 0,3 0,11 0,3
* work charactersitics
observations 2996 5232 6087 2141
cond3 1,00 0,0 0,96 0,2 0,98 0,1 0,96 0,2
j40a 0,70 0,5 0,11 0,3 0,44 0,5 0,00 0,0
j34 0,11 0,3 0,04 0,2 0,08 0,3 0,03 0,2
j35a 0,00 0,0 1,00 0,0 0,53 0,5 0,95 0,2
horas 47,90 16,3 46,66 21,8 47,16 19,0 46,99 22,5
horas1 47,87 15,6 47,60 21,1 47,62 18,3 47,94 21,8
j18c 0,92 0,3 0,24 0,4 0,65 0,5 0,00 0,0
labor contracts
observations 2745 1237 3982 0
j18a 0,20 0,4 0,16 0,4 0,19 0,4
j20a 0,13 0,3 0,47 0,5 0,24 0,4
j21a 0,41 0,5 0,16 0,4 0,33 0,5
j23_25 0,59 0,5 0,35 0,5 0,52 0,5
j28 0,78 0,4 0,47 0,5 0,69 0,5
observations 545 198 743,00
j18b 0,61 0,5 0,56 0,5 0,59 0,5
wages and earnings
observations 2779 1804 4233 350
salmes 496670 638421 222211 297777 411009 563773 118033 69528
observations 2779 1802 4231 350
j29h 2751,84 3695,0 1243,48 1798,6 2279,67 3268,3 694 837
observations 210 3244 1750 1704
j33m 591517 1489451 245449 455420 327583 705822 203746 402092
observations 210 3236 1745,00 1701
j33mh 4291,58 16723,6 1546,46 3830,6 2024,55 4810,8 1394,90 6263,9




Table 4 - continuation
size of firm =<10 no social security in health pensions or labor contracts
Formal Informal Formal Informal
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
working conditions
j36_1 0,16 0,4 0,18 0,4 0,17 0,4 0,20 0,4
j36_3 0,08 0,3 0,04 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,04 0,2
j36_6 0,02 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,00 0,1
j36_7 0,01 0,1 0,02 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,03 0,2
j36_8 0,03 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,04 0,2
j36_9 0,05 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,04 0,2 0,03 0,2
j36_10 0,51 0,5 0,56 0,5 0,54 0,5 0,53 0,5
work place (5)
j37_1 0,79 0,4 0,25 0,4 0,56 0,5 0,11 0,3
j37_2 0,01 0,1 0,10 0,3 0,06 0,2 0,10 0,3
j37_3 0,01 0,1 0,22 0,4 0,10 0,3 0,26 0,4
j37_4 0,01 0,1 0,12 0,3 0,05 0,2 0,15 0,4
j37_5 0,05 0,2 0,09 0,3 0,06 0,2 0,11 0,3
j37_6 0,01 0,1 0,03 0,2 0,01 0,1 0,04 0,2
j37_7 0,00 0,0 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1
j37_8 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1
j37_9 0,04 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,05 0,2
j37_11 0,03 0,2 0,05 0,2 0,04 0,2 0,06 0,2
j37_12 0,00 0,1 0,02 0,2 0,01 0,1 0,03 0,2
j37_13 0,02 0,1 0,04 0,2 0,02 0,1 0,06 0,2
j43a 0,15 0,4 0,14 0,3 0,14 0,4 0,14 0,4
j44 0,11 0,3 0,09 0,3 0,11 0,3 0,08 0,3
observations 2966 4074 5454 1586
j39a 29,61 28,2 26,05 30,6 27,60 28,9 27,39 31,9
occupation position %
j17=1 68,32 23,62 53,93 --
j17=2 23,3 0,02 11,48 --
j17=3 1,23 3,65 1,51 6,35
j17=4 0,03 7,21 2,69 10
j17=5 0,67 1,32 1,17 0,84
j17=6 5,21 52,83 23,15 70,57
j17=7 1 6,29 3,71 6,21
j17=8 0,13 1,57 0,72 1,96
j17=9 0,1 3,5 1,63 4,06
sector of activity %
rama3 18,99 14,45 0,17 0,13
rama5 4,71 7,05 0,05 0,09
rama6 13,79 33,49 0,25 0,30
rama9 39,95 27,27 0,32 0,30
other sector 22,56 17,74 0,20 0,17
Notes:
(1) only those individuals that are heads of household or spouses
(2) percentage relative to those who have the service
(3) including only those households that do have family business
(4) mean calculated only for those with variable not missing
(5) only for workers
(6) mean only for those who report commuting time to work
(7) of those who have contracts
(8) of those who have fixed term contracts
(9) those who report wages
(10) those who report wages and hours
(11) those who report earnings
Monetary figures are in colombian pesos of 1997
(12) those are patrons or independent professionals













INFORMALITY GAPS IN MAIN VARIABLES
Variables
name DEF.1 DEF.2  DEF. 3 DEF. 4
individual characteristics
age e02 -4,49 -5,42 -2,90 -1,59
years of schooling educa  (4) 3,02 2,40 3,27 2,64
normal weekly hours of work horas1 2,47 3,36 0,27 -0,32
hourly wages j29h (10) 1617,83 -- 1508,37 1585,91
hourly earnings j33mh 3401,92 3401,92 2745,12 629,64
GAP is defined as mean value for formal - mean value for informal. Based on Table 4
Table 7
GENDER GAPS IN MAIN VARIABLES
definition1 definition 2 definition 3 definition 4




age e02 1,69 2,30 1,45 1,09 1,22 1,99 1,57 1,88
years of schooling educa  (4) -1,44 0,23 -0,37 -0,20 -1,29 -0,10 -0,56 0,13
normal weekly hours of work horas1 7,53 7,48 6,05 11,26 8,86 6,91 8,45 5,20
hourly wages j29h (10) 40,67 384,44 309,49 -- 120,77 311,97 248,89 161,90
hourly earnings j33mh 2454,07 222,19 2454,07 222,19 3105,46 478,89 595,31 797,31







self-employed (excl.professionals) +domestic serv.+unpaid family worker
Formal Informal
Female Male Female Male
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
individual characteristics
observations 1908 2750 1667 1903
% Informal 47% 41%
genero 0,00 0,0 1,00 0,0 0,00 0,0 1,00 0,0
e02 34,11 10,5 35,80 12,0 38,37 13,0 40,67 14,2
e013a 0,09 0,3 0,12 0,3 0,17 0,4 0,14 0,3
marital status %
free union 16,51 27,53 22,32 33,32
married 29,35 39,82 26,99 37,99
widows 3,77 0,47 6,54 2,00
separated 14,73 4,22 17,46 6,25
single 35,64 27,96 26,69 20,44
monthly non-labor income
j46a 0,02 0,1 0,02 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,04 0,2
ja46b 9197 89622 9098 90935 3181 38039 12589 77949
j47a 0,06 0,2 0,01 0,1 0,04 0,2 0,00 0,1
ja47b 7025 48062 629 8663 4789 32679 434 8233
j48a 0,03 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1
ja48ba 2993 33675 6663 72491 1196 13749 3849 104473
j49a 0,06 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,10 0,3 0,05 0,2
ja49ba 4272 50599 1943 31859 3297 21078 1811 18114
j50a 0,05 0,2 0,07 0,3 0,05 0,2 0,06 0,2
ja50ba 7104 77800 9039 63847 4523 35250 5008 47951
j51a 0,01 0,1 0,02 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,02 0,2
ja51ba 10611 258901 16747 460466 6530 124440 13642 191615
j56a 0,02 0,1 0,04 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,04 0,2
ja56ba 525 7214 1139 12187 549 6308 1515 15716
household characteristics
perhoga 4,52 2,1 4,69 2,1 4,76 2,2 4,75 2,3
hacina 1,01 0,6 0,93 0,6 0,91 0,6 0,89 0,7
observations 1145 1862 1119 1393
ninme (1) 0,87 1,0 1,01 1,0 0,87 1,1 0,96 1,1
ni5 0,31 0,5 0,43 0,7 0,26 0,5 0,36 0,6
estrato de energia %
0 2,31 2,62 5,41 5,39
1-3 78,03 81,45 80,71 86,70
4-6 18,15 14,20 11,78 6,60
9 1,52 1,71 2,10 1,32
table continues in next page









Table 6 - continuation
self-employed (excl.professionals) +domestic serv.+unpaid family worker
Formal Informal
Female Male Female Male
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
housing characteristics
b02 0,91 0,3 0,90 0,3 0,87 0,3 0,85 0,4
b0603 0,21 0,4 0,18 0,4 0,15 0,4 0,12 0,3
b0605 0,10 0,3 0,08 0,3 0,06 0,2 0,04 0,2
c03 1,00 0,0 1,00 0,0 1,00 0,1 0,99 0,1
c04 (2) 0,96 0,2 0,95 0,2 0,92 0,3 0,92 0,3
c07 0,86 0,3 0,83 0,4 0,81 0,4 0,79 0,4
d01 0,58 0,5 0,57 0,5 0,61 0,5 0,58 0,5
c11 0,93 0,3 0,95 0,2 0,96 0,2 0,93 0,3
c23 (2) 0,96 0,2 0,93 0,2 0,91 0,3 0,91 0,3
c13 (2) 0,95 0,2 0,94 0,2 0,91 0,3 0,90 0,3
c17 0,97 0,2 0,97 0,2 0,94 0,2 0,93 0,3
c22 0,95 0,2 0,94 0,2 0,93 0,3 0,91 0,3
c29 0,73 0,4 0,65 0,5 0,55 0,5 0,52 0,5
k2001 0,87 0,3 0,80 0,4 0,76 0,4 0,75 0,4
k2005 0,90 0,3 0,86 0,3 0,78 0,4 0,78 0,4
k2009 0,20 0,4 0,18 0,4 0,15 0,4 0,15 0,4
k2016 0,37 0,5 0,30 0,5 0,22 0,4 0,21 0,4
k2020 0,09 0,3 0,08 0,3 0,05 0,2 0,03 0,2
neighborhood characteristics
u07 0,81 0,4 0,80 0,4 0,77 0,4 0,75 0,4
u0601 0,93 0,3 0,92 0,3 0,88 0,3 0,89 0,3
u04 0,29 0,5 0,29 0,5 0,29 0,5 0,29 0,5
u09 0,52 0,5 0,50 0,5 0,49 0,5 0,48 0,5
u10 0,31 0,5 0,32 0,5 0,35 0,5 0,34 0,5
u1101 0,75 0,4 0,76 0,4 0,74 0,4 0,76 0,4
u1102 0,07 0,2 0,07 0,3 0,05 0,2 0,07 0,2
u1103 0,03 0,2 0,04 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,04 0,2
u1104 0,53 0,5 0,52 0,5 0,49 0,5 0,48 0,5
u1106 0,28 0,4 0,31 0,5 0,33 0,5 0,35 0,5
u1107 0,60 0,5 0,57 0,5 0,55 0,5 0,55 0,5
u1110 0,04 0,2 0,05 0,2 0,05 0,2 0,06 0,2
u1111 0,42 0,5 0,41 0,5 0,38 0,5 0,39 0,5
u1112 0,06 0,2 0,05 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,06 0,2
u1116 0,54 0,5 0,50 0,5 0,44 0,5 0,42 0,5
u1201 0,55 0,5 0,54 0,5 0,48 0,5 0,49 0,5
u13 0,86 0,3 0,84 0,4 0,80 0,4 0,80 0,4
u17 0,55 0,5 0,55 0,5 0,55 0,5 0,54 0,5
u26 0,06 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,07 0,3 0,07 0,3
u30 0,14 0,3 0,16 0,4 0,16 0,4 0,17 0,4








Table 6 - continuation
self-employed (excl.professionals) +domestic serv.+unpaid family worker
Formal Informal
Female Male Female Male
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
family business in household
o01_4 0,10 0,3 0,12 0,3 0,34 0,5 0,23 0,4
observations 196 318 568 443
o09 (3) 2,41 2,1 2,09 1,6 1,87 1,3 1,93 1,4
o15 0,42 0,5 0,45 0,5 0,53 0,5 0,46 0,5
o18 0,06 0,2 0,04 0,2 0,01 0,1 0,02 0,1
o20 0,31 0,5 0,29 0,5 0,26 0,4 0,32 0,5
human capital characteristics
educa (4) 10,31 4,2 8,87 4,6 6,29 3,8 6,52 3,9
Not missing e 1635,00 2537,00 1571,00 1828,00
h001 0,99 0,1 0,97 0,2 0,92 0,3 0,95 0,2
i001 0,34 0,5 0,24 0,4 0,12 0,3 0,08 0,3
tecnic 0,08 0,3 0,04 0,2 0,02 0,1 0,03 0,2
f001 0,83 0,4 0,76 0,4 0,50 0,5 0,46 0,5
f009 0,18 0,4 0,19 0,4 0,09 0,3 0,13 0,3
f015 0,12 0,3 0,09 0,3 0,16 0,4 0,11 0,3
work characteristics (5)
observations 1908 2750 1667 1903
cond3 1,00 0,0 1,00 0,0 0,92 0,3 0,97 0,2
j40a 0,58 0,5 0,50 0,5 0,05 0,2 0,06 0,2
j34 0,07 0,3 0,09 0,3 0,02 0,1 0,05 0,2
j35a 0,35 0,5 0,42 0,5 0,96 0,2 0,95 0,2
horas 44,26 15,6 51,49 17,6 41,54 24,5 48,54 21,1
horas1 44,33 14,8 51,85 16,9 42,31 23,9 49,79 20,2
j18c 0,93 0,3 0,80 0,4 0,00 0,0 0,00 0,0
labor contracts
observations 1776 2206
j18a (7) 0,19 0,4 0 0 0,00
j20a 0,23 0,4 0 0
j21a 0,29 0,5 0 0
j23_25 0,56 0,5 0 0
j28 0,69 0,5 1 0
observations 342,00 401
j18b (8) 0,56 0,5 1 0
wages and earnings
observations 1787 2418 368 10
salmes (9) 377393 545196 441206 577128 103106 59731 193371 47761
observations 1787 2416 368 10
j29h (10) 2268,62 3133,1 2309 3368 664,00 1046,3 1048 796
observations 120 328 1165 1841
j33m (11) 467384 687873 875128 1488388 125876 226618 233938 302239
observations 120,00 328 1160,00 1838
j33mh 2876,67 4565,5 5330,74 14585,9 1135,26 3907,2 1357,44 2617,9









Table 6 - continuation
self-employed (excl.professionals) +domestic serv.+unpaid family worker
Formal Informal
Female Male Female Male
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
working conditions (5)
j36_1 0,14 0,3 0,18 0,4 0,18 0,4 0,21 0,4
j36_3 0,06 0,2 0,08 0,3 0,02 0,2 0,06 0,2
j36_6 0,03 0,2 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1
j36_7 0,01 0,1 0,02 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,02 0,1
j36_8 0,01 0,1 0,04 0,2 0,02 0,1 0,05 0,2
j36_9 0,04 0,2 0,04 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,03 0,2
j36_10 0,61 0,5 0,47 0,5 0,65 0,5 0,47 0,5
work place (5)
j37_1 0,86 0,3 0,60 0,5 0,09 0,3 0,11 0,3
j37_2 0,03 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,12 0,3
j37_3 0,04 0,2 0,02 0,1 0,46 0,5 0,16 0,4
j37_4 0,02 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,25 0,4 0,08 0,3
j37_5 0,02 0,1 0,06 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,16 0,4
j37_6 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,03 0,2 0,04 0,2
j37_7 0,01 0,1 0,00 0,0 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1
j37_8 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,02 0,1
j37_9 0,00 0,0 0,07 0,3 0,00 0,1 0,13 0,3
j37_11 0,00 0,1 0,06 0,2 0,00 0,1 0,10 0,3
j37_12 0,00 0,0 0,01 0,1 0,00 0,1 0,06 0,2
j37_13 0,01 0,1 0,08 0,3 0,00 0,0 0,02 0,1
j43a 0,06 0,2 0,20 0,4 0,05 0,2 0,23 0,4
j44 0,10 0,3 0,11 0,3 0,08 0,3 0,11 0,3
observations 1841 2693 903 26 31
j39a (6) 26,30 24,3 29,95 31,8 25,09 29,5










sector of activity % (5)
rama3 0,15 0,21 0,16 0,11
rama5 0,01 0,07 0,00 0,15
rama6 0,29 0,19 0,35 0,28
rama9 0,42 0,24 0,46 0,21
other sector 0,13 0,29 0,03 0,26









Table 6 - continuation
self-employed (excludes professional)
Formal Informal
Female Male Female Male
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
individual characteristics
observations 2410 2812 1165 1841
% Informal 33% 40%
genero 0,00 0,0 1,00 0,0 0,00 0,0 1,00 0,0
e02 34,29 11,1 35,75 12,1 39,83 12,6 40,92 14,2
e013a 0,12 0,3 0,12 0,3 0,15 0,4 0,14 0,4
marital status %
free union 16,85 27,38 24,12 33,73
married 27,55 39,30 29,70 38,73
widows 3,78 0,46 7,73 2,06
separated 14,98 4,20 18,11 6,36
single 36,85 28,66 20,34 19,12
monthly non-labor income
j46a 0,02 0,1 0,02 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,03 0,2
ja46b 7457 80056 9169 90321 4188 44574 12597 78565
j47a 0,05 0,2 0,01 0,1 0,05 0,2 0,00 0,1
ja47b 6134 44178 616 8567 5669 35740 448 8371
j48a 0,02 0,1 0,03 0,2 0,02 0,1 0,02 0,1
ja48ba 2489 30300 6517 71694 1465 15167 3979 106216
j49a 0,06 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,10 0,3 0,04 0,2
ja49ba 3909 45739 1943 31528 3628 22394 1807 18358
j50a 0,05 0,2 0,07 0,3 0,07 0,3 0,06 0,2
ja50ba 5928 69489 8845 63152 5844 41311 5169 48743
j51a 0,01 0,1 0,02 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,02 0,2
ja51ba 8557 230426 16387 455366 9020 148680 14087 194800
j56a 0,02 0,1 0,04 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,04 0,2
ja56ba 477 6512 1119 12054 659 7377 1560 15975
household characteristics
perhoga 4,63 2,1 4,70 2,1 4,64 2,2 4,74 2,3
hacina 0,98 0,6 0,93 0,6 0,92 0,6 0,89 0,7
observations 1384 1883 880 1372
ninme (1) 0,87 1,0 1,01 1,0 0,87 1,1 0,97 1,1
ni5 0,30 0,5 0,43 0,7 0,26 0,5 0,36 0,6
estrato de energia %
0 3,24 2,64 4,82 5,46
1-3 76,20 81,70 85,64 86,52
4-6 18,73 14,00 7,82 6,66
9 1,83 1,67 1,72 1,36
table continues in next page










Table 6 - continuation
self-employed (excludes professional)
Formal Informal
Female Male Female Male
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
housing characteristics
b02 0,90 0,3 0,90 0,3 0,87 0,3 0,85 0,4
b0603 0,21 0,4 0,18 0,4 0,12 0,3 0,12 0,3
b0605 0,10 0,3 0,08 0,3 0,05 0,2 0,04 0,2
c03 1,00 0,0 1,00 0,0 1,00 0,1 0,99 0,1
c04 (2) 0,95 0,2 0,95 0,2 0,93 0,3 0,92 0,3
c07 0,85 0,4 0,83 0,4 0,82 0,4 0,79 0,4
d01 0,59 0,5 0,57 0,5 0,60 0,5 0,58 0,5
c11 0,94 0,2 0,95 0,2 0,95 0,2 0,93 0,3
c23 (2) 0,95 0,2 0,94 0,2 0,91 0,3 0,91 0,3
c13 (2) 0,95 0,2 0,94 0,2 0,91 0,3 0,90 0,3
c17 0,97 0,2 0,97 0,2 0,94 0,2 0,93 0,3
c22 0,95 0,2 0,94 0,2 0,92 0,3 0,91 0,3
c29 0,69 0,5 0,65 0,5 0,55 0,5 0,52 0,5
k2001 0,84 0,4 0,80 0,4 0,77 0,4 0,74 0,4
k2005 0,88 0,3 0,86 0,3 0,77 0,4 0,77 0,4
k2009 0,20 0,4 0,18 0,4 0,12 0,3 0,15 0,4
k2016 0,35 0,5 0,29 0,5 0,19 0,4 0,21 0,4
k2020 0,09 0,3 0,08 0,3 0,03 0,2 0,02 0,2
neighborhood characteristics
u07 0,80 0,4 0,80 0,4 0,77 0,4 0,75 0,4
u0601 0,92 0,3 0,91 0,3 0,88 0,3 0,89 0,3
u04 0,29 0,5 0,29 0,5 0,29 0,5 0,28 0,4
u09 0,52 0,5 0,50 0,5 0,47 0,5 0,47 0,5
u10 0,32 0,5 0,33 0,5 0,35 0,5 0,34 0,5
u1101 0,74 0,4 0,75 0,4 0,75 0,4 0,76 0,4
u1102 0,06 0,2 0,07 0,3 0,06 0,2 0,07 0,2
u1103 0,03 0,2 0,04 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,04 0,2
u1104 0,52 0,5 0,52 0,5 0,50 0,5 0,48 0,5
u1106 0,28 0,4 0,31 0,5 0,35 0,5 0,35 0,5
u1107 0,59 0,5 0,57 0,5 0,56 0,5 0,55 0,5
u1110 0,04 0,2 0,05 0,2 0,05 0,2 0,06 0,2
u1111 0,40 0,5 0,41 0,5 0,39 0,5 0,39 0,5
u1112 0,06 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,06 0,2
u1116 0,53 0,5 0,50 0,5 0,42 0,5 0,42 0,5
u1201 0,54 0,5 0,53 0,5 0,47 0,5 0,49 0,5
u13 0,85 0,4 0,84 0,4 0,81 0,4 0,79 0,4
u17 0,55 0,5 0,56 0,5 0,55 0,5 0,54 0,5
u26 0,05 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,08 0,3 0,07 0,3
u30 0,14 0,3 0,16 0,4 0,17 0,4 0,17 0,4








Table 6 - continuation
self-employed (excludes professional)
Formal Informal
Female Male Female Male
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
family business in household
o01_4 0,12 0,3 0,12 0,3 0,40 0,5 0,22 0,4
observations 293 348 471 413
o09 (3) 2,55 1,9 2,17 1,6 1,67 1,1 1,84 1,4
o15 0,48 0,5 0,45 0,5 0,52 0,5 0,47 0,5
o18 0,05 0,2 0,04 0,2 0,00 0,1 0,02 0,1
o20 0,35 0,5 0,30 0,5 0,22 0,4 0,31 0,5
human capital characteristics
educa (4) 9,20 4,6 8,83 4,6 6,71 3,9 6,51 3,9
missing educa 2096,00 2585,00 1110,00 1780,00
h001 0,97 0,2 0,97 0,2 0,93 0,3 0,95 0,2
i001 0,28 0,4 0,24 0,4 0,15 0,4 0,07 0,3
tecnic 0,06 0,2 0,04 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,03 0,2
f001 0,76 0,4 0,75 0,4 0,52 0,5 0,45 0,5
f009 0,16 0,4 0,19 0,4 0,08 0,3 0,13 0,3
f015 0,13 0,3 0,09 0,3 0,16 0,4 0,11 0,3
work characteristics (5)
observations 2410 2812 1165 1841
cond3 0,94 0,2 0,98 0,1 1,00 0,0 1,00 0,0
j40a 0,48 0,5 0,49 0,5 0,05 0,2 0,06 0,2
j34 0,06 0,2 0,09 0,3 0,03 0,2 0,05 0,2
j35a 0,49 0,5 0,43 0,5 0,95 0,2 0,94 0,2
horas 45,49 17,3 51,37 17,6 37,82 24,5 48,63 21,1
horas1 45,67 16,7 51,72 17,1 38,66 23,9 49,92 20,1
j18c 0,74 0,4 0,78 0,4 0,00 0,00
labor contracts
observations 1776 2206
j18a (7) 0,19 0,4 0 0
j20a 0,23 0,4 0 0
j21a 0,29 0,5 0 0
j23_25 0,56 0,5 0 0
j28 0,69 0,5 1 0
observations 342,00 401
j18b (8) 0,56 0,5 1 0
wages and earnings
observations 2155 2426 0
salmes (9) 330554 507664 440185 576164
observations 2155 2426 0
j29h (10) 1994,61 2947,9 2304 3362
observations 120 328 1165 1841
j33m (11) 467384 687873 875128 1488388 125876 226618 233938 302239
observations 120,00 328 1160,00 1838
j33mh 2876,67 4565,5 5330,74 14585,9 1135,26 3907,2 1357,44 2617,9









Table 6 - continuation
self-employed (excludes professional)
Formal Informal
Female Male Female Male
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
working conditions (5)
j36_1 0,14 0,3 0,18 0,4 0,20 0,4 0,22 0,4
j36_3 0,05 0,2 0,08 0,3 0,03 0,2 0,06 0,2
j36_6 0,02 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1
j36_7 0,01 0,1 0,02 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,02 0,1
j36_8 0,01 0,1 0,04 0,2 0,02 0,2 0,05 0,2
j36_9 0,04 0,2 0,04 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,03 0,2
j36_10 0,64 0,5 0,48 0,5 0,60 0,5 0,46 0,5
work place (5)
j37_1 0,70 0,5 0,59 0,5 0,10 0,3 0,11 0,3
j37_2 0,03 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,09 0,3 0,12 0,3
j37_3 0,12 0,3 0,03 0,2 0,47 0,5 0,15 0,4
j37_4 0,11 0,3 0,02 0,1 0,16 0,4 0,08 0,3
j37_5 0,02 0,1 0,06 0,2 0,09 0,3 0,16 0,4
j37_6 0,00 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,04 0,2 0,04 0,2
j37_7 0,00 0,1 0,00 0,0 0,02 0,1 0,01 0,1
j37_8 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,02 0,1 0,02 0,1
j37_9 0,00 0,0 0,07 0,3 0,01 0,1 0,13 0,3
j37_11 0,00 0,0 0,05 0,2 0,00 0,1 0,10 0,3
j37_12 0,00 0,0 0,01 0,1 0,00 0,1 0,06 0,2
j37_13 0,01 0,1 0,08 0,3 0,00 0,0 0,02 0,1
j43a 0,06 0,2 0,20 0,4 0,05 0,2 0,23 0,4
j44 0,09 0,3 0,11 0,3 0,08 0,3 0,11 0,3
observations 2127 2727 1569
j39a (6) 26,17 24,7 29,85 31,7 24,98 30,6 26,45 31,4










sector of activity % (5)
rama3 0,13 0,20 0,21 0,11
rama5 0,01 0,07 0,01 0,15
rama6 0,27 0,19 0,41 0,27
rama9 0,48 0,24 0,34 0,20
other sector 0,11 0,29 0,03 0,26
table continues in next page 
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Table 6 - continuation
size of firm =<10
Formal Informal
Female Male Female Male
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
individual characteristics
observations 1291 1705 2284 2948
% Informal 64% 63%
genero 0,00 0,0 1,00 0,0 0,00 0,0 1,00 0,0
e02 34,51 10,0 35,73 11,1 36,99 12,7 38,98 14,1
e013a 0,09 0,3 0,11 0,3 0,15 0,4 0,14 0,3
marital status %
free union 14,72 25,34 21,76 32,53
married 31,68 44,28 26,31 36,06
widows 3,64 0,65 5,87 1,36
separated 14,48 3,99 16,86 5,66
single 35,48 25,75 29,20 24,39
monthly non-labor income
j46a 0,02 0,1 0,02 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,03 0,2
ja46b 10778 100564 8301 74851 3913 45254 11812 91628
j47a 0,06 0,2 0,02 0,1 0,05 0,2 0,00 0,1
ja47b 6674 42284 934 10750 5592 41232 327 6842
j48a 0,03 0,2 0,04 0,2 0,02 0,1 0,02 0,1
ja48ba 3597 38349 5666 45880 1340 15925 5424 103596
j49a 0,05 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,09 0,3 0,04 0,2
ja49ba 3402 22691 2195 34751 4052 46606 1712 21452
j50a 0,06 0,2 0,08 0,3 0,05 0,2 0,05 0,2
ja50ba 6549 41737 9274 58264 5534 70574 6301 57677
j51a 0,01 0,1 0,02 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,02 0,1
ja51ba 7259 129857 7905 105035 9527 240348 19857 463738
j56a 0,02 0,1 0,04 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,03 0,2
ja56ba 640 8448 863 7155 477 5672 1542 16378
household characteristics
perhoga 4,50 2,0 4,58 2,0 4,71 2,2 4,79 2,3
hacina 1,04 0,6 0,97 0,6 0,91 0,6 0,88 0,7
observations 794 1178 1470 2077
ninme 0,84 0,9 1,02 1,0 0,89 1,1 0,97 1,1
ni5 0,28 0,5 0,43 0,6 0,29 0,6 0,38 0,7
estrato de energia %
0 2,71 3,23 4,34 4,06
1-3 77,45 80,12 80,31 85,62
4-6 18,36 15,43 13,37 8,59
9 1,47 1,23 1,97 1,74
table continues in next page
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Table 6 - continuation
size of firm =<10
Formal Informal
Female Male Female Male
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
* housing characteristics
b02 0,92 0,3 0,92 0,3 0,88 0,3 0,85 0,4
b0603 0,22 0,4 0,19 0,4 0,16 0,4 0,13 0,3
b0605 0,10 0,3 0,10 0,3 0,07 0,3 0,05 0,2
c03 1,00 0,0 1,00 0,0 1,00 0,1 0,99 0,1
c04 0,96 0,2 0,95 0,2 0,94 0,2 0,93 0,3
c07 0,87 0,3 0,85 0,4 0,82 0,4 0,80 0,4
d01 0,61 0,5 0,59 0,5 0,58 0,5 0,56 0,5
c11 0,95 0,2 0,95 0,2 0,94 0,2 0,94 0,2
c23 0,95 0,2 0,94 0,2 0,92 0,3 0,92 0,3
c13 0,96 0,2 0,94 0,2 0,92 0,3 0,91 0,3
c17 0,97 0,2 0,98 0,2 0,95 0,2 0,94 0,2
c22 0,96 0,2 0,94 0,2 0,93 0,3 0,92 0,3
c29 0,77 0,4 0,70 0,5 0,58 0,5 0,54 0,5
k2001 0,90 0,3 0,85 0,4 0,77 0,4 0,74 0,4
k2005 0,92 0,3 0,90 0,3 0,80 0,4 0,79 0,4
k2009 0,21 0,4 0,20 0,4 0,15 0,4 0,15 0,4
k2016 0,40 0,5 0,34 0,5 0,24 0,4 0,22 0,4
k2020 0,09 0,3 0,10 0,3 0,06 0,2 0,04 0,2
* neighborhood characteristics
u07 0,82 0,4 0,77 0,4 0,77 0,4 0,78 0,4
u0601 0,93 0,3 0,91 0,3 0,89 0,3 0,90 0,3
u04 0,29 0,5 0,29 0,5 0,29 0,5 0,29 0,5
u09 0,52 0,5 0,52 0,5 0,50 0,5 0,47 0,5
u10 0,31 0,5 0,32 0,5 0,34 0,5 0,34 0,5
u1101 0,76 0,4 0,75 0,4 0,74 0,4 0,76 0,4
u1102 0,07 0,3 0,07 0,3 0,06 0,2 0,07 0,3
u1103 0,03 0,2 0,04 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,04 0,2
u1104 0,54 0,5 0,50 0,5 0,50 0,5 0,50 0,5
u1106 0,28 0,4 0,30 0,5 0,31 0,5 0,35 0,5
u1107 0,62 0,5 0,57 0,5 0,56 0,5 0,56 0,5
u1110 0,04 0,2 0,04 0,2 0,05 0,2 0,05 0,2
u1111 0,43 0,5 0,41 0,5 0,39 0,5 0,40 0,5
u1112 0,05 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,07 0,2 0,06 0,2
u1116 0,54 0,5 0,50 0,5 0,47 0,5 0,45 0,5
u1201 0,56 0,5 0,54 0,5 0,50 0,5 0,50 0,5
u13 0,86 0,3 0,83 0,4 0,82 0,4 0,81 0,4
u17 0,56 0,5 0,56 0,5 0,55 0,5 0,55 0,5
u26 0,06 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,07 0,3
u30 0,14 0,3 0,15 0,4 0,16 0,4 0,18 0,4






Table 6 - continuation
size of firm =<10
Formal Informal
Female Male Female Male
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
* family business in household
o01_4 0,08 0,3 0,08 0,3 0,29 0,5 0,21 0,4
observations 97 141 667 620
o09 2,04 2,2 1,70 1,4 2,00 1,4 2,06 1,5
o15 0,39 0,5 0,44 0,5 0,52 0,5 0,46 0,5
o18 0,04 0,2 0,01 0,1 0,02 0,1 0,03 0,2
o20 0,26 0,4 0,18 0,4 0,27 0,4 0,33 0,5
* human capital charactersitics
educa 10,97 4,0 9,69 4,5 7,00 4,1 6,90 4,1
education missing 1079,00 1544,00 2127,00 2821,00
h001 0,99 0,1 0,98 0,1 0,94 0,2 0,95 0,2
i001 0,42 0,5 0,32 0,5 0,13 0,3 0,09 0,3
tecnic 0,08 0,3 0,05 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,03 0,2
f001 0,92 0,3 0,87 0,3 0,55 0,5 0,50 0,5
f009 0,19 0,4 0,21 0,4 0,11 0,3 0,14 0,3
f015 0,12 0,3 0,09 0,3 0,15 0,4 0,10 0,3
* work charactersitics
observations 1291 1705 2284 2948
cond3 1,00 0,0 1,00 0,1 0,94 0,2 0,98 0,1
j40a 0,73 0,4 0,68 0,5 0,11 0,3 0,11 0,3
j34 0,09 0,3 0,12 0,3 0,02 0,1 0,05 0,2
j35a 0,00 0,0 0,00 0,0 1,00 0,0 1,00 0,0
horas 42,86 14,3 51,72 16,8 43,07 23,0 49,45 20,4
horas1 42,83 13,2 51,69 16,2 43,71 22,4 50,62 19,5
j18c 0,94 0,2 0,90 0,3 0,24 0,4 0,23 0,4
labor contracts
observations 1217 1528 559 678
j18a 0,20 0,4 0 0 0,17 0,4 0 0
j20a 0,12 0,3 0 0 0,46 0,5 0 1
j21a 0,36 0,5 0 0 0,14 0,4 0 0
j23_25 0,62 0,5 1 0 0,42 0,5 0 0
j28 0,79 0,4 1 0 0,47 0,5 0 0
observations 248,00 297 94,00 104
j18b 0,56 0,5 1 0 0,56 0,5 1 1
wages and earnings
observations 1221 1558 934 870
salmes 441716 602819 539737 662000 185234 287254 261908 303869
observations 1221 1558 934 868
j29h 2684,13 3518,3 2805 3828 1093,21 1562,6 1405 2010
observations 69 141 1216 2028
j33m 291712 397725 738230 1780179 150168 309930 302580 515308
observations 69,00 141 1211,00 2025
j33mh 2206,48 4111,1 5311,94 20152,4 1246,78 3993,2 1725,67 3719,4











Table 6 - continuation
size of firm =<10
Formal Informal
Female Male Female Male
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
working conditions
j36_1 0,15 0,4 0,18 0,4 0,16 0,4 0,20 0,4
j36_3 0,07 0,2 0,09 0,3 0,03 0,2 0,06 0,2
j36_6 0,03 0,2 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1
j36_7 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,02 0,2
j36_8 0,02 0,1 0,05 0,2 0,02 0,1 0,04 0,2
j36_9 0,05 0,2 0,04 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,03 0,2
j36_10 0,58 0,5 0,46 0,5 0,66 0,5 0,48 0,5
work place (5)
j37_1 0,90 0,3 0,70 0,5 0,28 0,4 0,22 0,4
j37_2 0,00 0,1 0,02 0,1 0,07 0,3 0,13 0,3
j37_3 0,02 0,1 0,00 0,0 0,35 0,5 0,12 0,3
j37_4 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,19 0,4 0,06 0,2
j37_5 0,03 0,2 0,07 0,3 0,05 0,2 0,12 0,3
j37_6 0,01 0,1 0,02 0,1 0,02 0,1 0,03 0,2
j37_7 0,00 0,0 0,00 0,0 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1
j37_8 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1
j37_9 0,00 0,1 0,08 0,3 0,00 0,1 0,11 0,3
j37_11 0,00 0,1 0,05 0,2 0,00 0,1 0,09 0,3
j37_12 0,00 0,0 0,00 0,1 0,00 0,1 0,04 0,2
j37_13 0,01 0,1 0,03 0,2 0,00 0,1 0,07 0,2
j43a 0,07 0,3 0,21 0,4 0,05 0,2 0,21 0,4
j44 0,10 0,3 0,12 0,3 0,08 0,3 0,10 0,3
observations 1264 1702 1480 2594
j39a 28,14 24,9 30,71 30,3 23,99 27,0 27,23 32,4
occupation position %
j17=1 65,84 70,21 24,43 23
j17=2 28,43 19,41 0,04
j17=3 0,23 1,99 0,39 6,17
j17=4 0,08 16,07 0,34
j17=5 0,39 0,88 1,31 1,32
j17=6 4,49 5,75 48,38 56,28
j17=7 0,46 1,41 3,46 8,48
j17=8 0,23 0,09 2,71
j17=9 0,08 0,12 5,82 1,7
sector of activity %
rama3 0,14 0,22 0,16 0,13
rama5 0,01 0,07 0,01 0,12
rama6 0,17 0,12 0,40 0,29
rama9 0,53 0,30 0,39 0,19
other sector 0,14 0,29 0,05 0,27
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Table 6 - continuation
no (social security in health or in pensions or labor contracts)
Formal Informal
Female Male Female Male
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
individual characteristics
observations 2708 3379 867 1274
% Informal 24% 27%
genero 0,00 0,0 1,00 0,0 0,00 0,0 1,00 0,0
e02 35,77 11,4 37,34 12,9 37,12 13,2 38,99 13,8
e013a 0,12 0,3 0,12 0,3 0,17 0,4 0,14 0,4
marital status %
free union 18,06 27,85 22,84 35,32
married 31,20 42,56 19,03 29,83
widows 4,51 0,95 6,81 1,49
separated 15,21 3,94 18,45 8,01
single 31,02 24,71 32,87 25,35
monthly non-labor income
j46a 0,02 0,1 0,03 0,2 0,00 0,0 0,00 0,0
ja46b 8376 80833 14177 99671 196 5774 840 21345
j47a 0,06 0,2 0,01 0,1 0,04 0,2 0,00 0,1
ja47b 6310 43037 605 8889 4960 36813 402 7325
j48a 0,03 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1
ja48ba 2657 29798 7030 101324 586 9238 1487 19924
j49a 0,06 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,11 0,3 0,04 0,2
ja49ba 3401 42265 2073 30924 5120 30124 1400 12004
j50a 0,06 0,2 0,07 0,3 0,05 0,2 0,05 0,2
ja50ba 6591 69688 9312 66994 3743 23231 2293 17528
j51a 0,01 0,1 0,02 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1
ja51ba 11018 237603 16465 418825 1495 29549 12856 217374
j56a 0,02 0,1 0,04 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,03 0,2
ja56ba 546 7481 1262 13147 504 4026 1376 15206
household characteristics
perhoga 4,60 2,1 4,66 2,1 4,75 2,3 4,86 2,5
hacina 0,99 0,6 0,93 0,6 0,87 0,6 0,85 0,7
observations 1741 2397 523 858
ninme (1) 0,88 1,0 1,01 1,1 0,84 1,1 0,94 1,1
ni5 0,30 0,6 0,41 0,6 0,23 0,5 0,36 0,6
estrato de energia %
0 2,81 3,23 6,71 5,13
1-3 78,98 82,21 80,23 87,29
4-6 16,59 13,05 10,75 5,92
9 1,63 1,51 2,31 1,66







Table 6 - continuation
no (social security in health or in pensions or labor contracts)
Formal Informal
Female Male Female Male
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
housing characteristics
b02 0,90 0,3 0,90 0,3 0,85 0,4 0,84 0,4
b0603 0,20 0,4 0,18 0,4 0,13 0,3 0,09 0,3
b0605 0,09 0,3 0,07 0,3 0,06 0,2 0,04 0,2
c03 1,00 0,0 1,00 0,1 1,00 0,1 0,99 0,1
c04 (2) 0,96 0,2 0,95 0,2 0,91 0,3 0,90 0,3
c07 0,85 0,4 0,84 0,4 0,79 0,4 0,76 0,4
d01 0,59 0,5 0,58 0,5 0,58 0,5 0,57 0,5
c11 0,94 0,2 0,94 0,2 0,96 0,2 0,94 0,2
c23 (2) 0,95 0,2 0,94 0,2 0,88 0,3 0,89 0,3
c13 (2) 0,94 0,2 0,94 0,2 0,91 0,3 0,87 0,3
c17 0,97 0,2 0,97 0,2 0,93 0,2 0,92 0,3
c22 0,95 0,2 0,94 0,2 0,91 0,3 0,90 0,3
c29 0,69 0,5 0,65 0,5 0,51 0,5 0,47 0,5
k2001 0,84 0,4 0,81 0,4 0,74 0,4 0,69 0,5
k2005 0,88 0,3 0,87 0,3 0,75 0,4 0,72 0,4
k2009 0,19 0,4 0,19 0,4 0,12 0,3 0,11 0,3
k2016 0,33 0,5 0,30 0,5 0,18 0,4 0,15 0,4
k2020 0,08 0,3 0,07 0,3 0,04 0,2 0,03 0,2
neighborhood characteristics
u07 0,80 0,4 0,79 0,4 0,76 0,4 0,74 0,4
u0601 0,91 0,3 0,91 0,3 0,89 0,3 0,89 0,3
u04 0,29 0,5 0,29 0,5 0,30 0,5 0,29 0,5
u09 0,51 0,5 0,50 0,5 0,48 0,5 0,46 0,5
u10 0,32 0,5 0,34 0,5 0,34 0,5 0,32 0,5
u1101 0,74 0,4 0,75 0,4 0,76 0,4 0,77 0,4
u1102 0,06 0,2 0,07 0,3 0,05 0,2 0,06 0,2
u1103 0,03 0,2 0,04 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,04 0,2
u1104 0,52 0,5 0,51 0,5 0,49 0,5 0,49 0,5
u1106 0,29 0,5 0,31 0,5 0,33 0,5 0,37 0,5
u1107 0,59 0,5 0,57 0,5 0,54 0,5 0,54 0,5
u1110 0,04 0,2 0,05 0,2 0,05 0,2 0,05 0,2
u1111 0,41 0,5 0,42 0,5 0,35 0,5 0,36 0,5
u1112 0,06 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,06 0,2
u1116 0,52 0,5 0,49 0,5 0,43 0,5 0,42 0,5
u1201 0,53 0,5 0,52 0,5 0,49 0,5 0,50 0,5
u13 0,84 0,4 0,83 0,4 0,83 0,4 0,80 0,4
u17 0,55 0,5 0,55 0,5 0,57 0,5 0,55 0,5
u26 0,06 0,2 0,07 0,2 0,06 0,2 0,06 0,2
u30 0,15 0,4 0,16 0,4 0,15 0,4 0,18 0,4





Table 6 - continuation
no (social security in health or in pensions or labor contracts)
Formal Informal
Female Male Female Male
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
family business in household
o01_4 0,18 0,4 0,14 0,3 0,33 0,5 0,23 0,4
observations 478 467 286
o09 (3) 2,02 1,6 1,96 1,5 1,99 1,5 2,05 1,4
o15 0,50 0,5 0,48 0,5 0,52 0,5 0,43 0,5
o18 0,03 0,2 0,04 0,2 0,00 0,1 0,01 0,1
o20 0,27 0,4 0,29 0,5 0,27 0,4 0,32 0,5
human capital characteristics
educa (4) 9,11 4,5 8,55 4,5 6,07 3,8 6,20 3,9
missing educa 2395,00 3131,00 811,00 1234,00
h001 0,97 0,2 0,97 0,2 0,91 0,3 0,93 0,3
i001 0,28 0,5 0,22 0,4 0,09 0,3 0,06 0,2
tecnic 0,06 0,2 0,04 0,2 0,02 0,1 0,02 0,2
f001 0,90 0,3 0,87 0,3 0,00 0,0 0,00 0,0
f009 0,15 0,4 0,19 0,4 0,09 0,3 0,12 0,3
f015 0,14 0,3 0,11 0,3 0,15 0,4 0,08 0,3
work characteristics (5)
observations 2708 3379 867 1274
cond3 0,97 0,2 0,99 0,1 0,93 0,3 0,98 0,1
j40a 0,44 0,5 0,44 0,5 0,00 0,0 0,00 0,0
j34 0,06 0,2 0,09 0,3 0,01 0,1 0,04 0,2
j35a 0,53 0,5 0,52 0,5 0,97 0,2 0,94 0,2
horas 42,66 18,4 50,77 18,7 44,04 25,1 48,99 20,3
horas1 42,92 17,6 51,37 18,0 44,84 24,7 50,05 19,3
j18c 0,66 0,5 0,65 0,5 0,00 0,0 0,00 0,0
labor contracts
observations 1776 2206 0 0
j18a (7) 0,19 0,4 0 0
j20a 0,23 0,4 0 0
j21a 0,29 0,5 0 0
j23_25 0,56 0,5 0 0
j28 0,69 0,5 1 0
observations 342,00 401
j18b (8) 0,56 0,5 1 0
wages and earnings
observations 1941 2292 214 136
salmes (9) 356191 528289 457432 588295 98024 63369 149518 67292
observations 1941 2290 214 136
j29h (10) 2144,97 3051,4 2394 3438 630,86 1002,0 793 461
observations 691 1059 594 1110
j33m (11) 193673 402418 414960 835818 116000 159614 250702 477830
observations 687,00 1058 593,00 1110
j33mh 1663,61 5304,8 2258,92 4447,9 875,55 1300,5 1672,86 7689,5
table continues in next page 
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T a b l e6-c o n t i n u a t i o n
no (social security in health or in pensions or labor contracts)
Formal Informal
Female Male Female Male
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
working conditions (5)
j36_1 0,15 0,4 0,19 0,4 0,18 0,4 0,21 0,4
j36_3 0,05 0,2 0,08 0,3 0,03 0,2 0,05 0,2
j36_6 0,02 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,00 0,1
j36_7 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,02 0,1 0,03 0,2
j36_8 0,02 0,1 0,04 0,2 0,02 0,1 0,05 0,2
j36_9 0,04 0,2 0,04 0,2 0,03 0,2 0,03 0,2
j36_10 0,63 0,5 0,47 0,5 0,63 0,5 0,46 0,5
work place (5)
j37_1 0,63 0,5 0,51 0,5 0,10 0,3 0,11 0,3
j37_2 0,04 0,2 0,07 0,3 0,07 0,3 0,12 0,3
j37_3 0,17 0,4 0,05 0,2 0,43 0,5 0,14 0,4
j37_4 0,09 0,3 0,03 0,2 0,26 0,4 0,08 0,3
j37_5 0,03 0,2 0,09 0,3 0,06 0,2 0,14 0,3
j37_6 0,01 0,1 0,02 0,1 0,04 0,2 0,04 0,2
j37_7 0,01 0,1 0,00 0,0 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1
j37_8 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1 0,01 0,1
j37_9 0,00 0,1 0,10 0,3 0,00 0,0 0,09 0,3
j37_11 0,00 0,0 0,06 0,2 0,01 0,1 0,11 0,3
j37_12 0,00 0,0 0,02 0,1 0,00 0,1 0,05 0,2
j37_13 0,00 0,1 0,04 0,2 0,01 0,1 0,09 0,3
j43a 0,06 0,2 0,21 0,4 0,05 0,2 0,21 0,4
j44 0,10 0,3 0,12 0,3 0,07 0,3 0,10 0,3
observations 2248 3206 496 1090
j39a (6) 25,76 24,2 28,89 31,8 26,53 33,4 27,77 31,2
occupation position % (5)
j17=1 51,99 55,49
j17=2 13,59 9,8
j17=3 0,3 2,49 0,46 10,36
j17=4 5,83 0,18 24,22 0,31
j17=5 1,03 1,27 0,81 0,86
j17=6 22,42 23,73 64,13 74,96
j17=7 2,03 5,06 3,46 8,08
j17=8 0,04 1,27 0,12 3,22
j17=9 2,77 0,71 6,81 2,2
sector of activity % (5)
rama3 0,16 0,19 0,15 0,12
rama5 0,01 0,08 0,01 0,15
rama6 0,30 0,21 0,35 0,27
rama9 0,43 0,24 0,48 0,19
other sector 0,10 0,28 0,03 0,27
Notes:
(1) only those individuals that are heads of household or spouses
(2) percentage relative to those who have the service
(3) including only those households that do have family business
(4) mean calculated only for those with variable not missing
(5) only for workers
(6) mean only for those who report commuting time to work
(7) of those who have contracts
(8) of those who have fixed term contracts
(9) those who report wages
(10) those who report wages and hours
(11) those who report earnings
Monetary figures are in colombian pesos of 1997
(12) those are patrons or independent professionals

















security in health or 
pensions
Definitions of informal sector Mean Mean Mean Mean
self-employed-domestic serv.-
family worker without pay =1 0 -- 0 0,39 0,06
1 -- 0,84 0,95 0,52
self-employed (excludes 
professional)=1 0 0,11 -- 0,46 0,11
1 1 -- 0,95 0,52
(size of firm =<10)=1 00 ,05 0,05 -- 0,03
1 0,65 0,54 -- 0,39
without labor contracts or social 
security in health or pensions=1
0 0,28 0,24 0,52 --
1 0,86 0,72 0,95 --




Table 10 Probit models of informal sector - definition 2
Dependent variable: probability of being an informal worker
Females Males
12 3 4
Variable Coeff. t-statistic dF/dx Coeff. t-statistic dF/dx Coeff. t-statistic dF/dx Coeff. t-statistic dF/dx
Age 0,007 (3,12) * 0,003 0,006105 (2,29) * 0,002 0,01462 (8,97) * 0,006 0,015545 (7,80) * 0,006
Years of schooling -0,13112 (20,00) * -0,052 -0,12337 (15,93) * -0,049 -0,06257 (12,22) * -0,024 -0,07056 (11,36) * -0,027
Dummy: Father's education is some secundary or more -0,22917 (3,12) -0,091   0,017591 (0,28) 0,007
Lives in house or apartment 0,41961 (3,04) * 0,162 0,287583 (1,74) * 0,113 -0,15564 (1,34) -0,061 -0,15226 (1,14) -0,060
Non-labor income/100.000 -25,8419 (1,04)   -10,305 -18,6467 (0,77) -7,432 -12,3287 (0,81) -4,801 -29,2898 (1,66) * -11,389
Ratio of rooms/persons in household 0,04659 (1,17) 0,019 0,023984 (0,53) 0,010 0,01377 (0,42) 0,005 0,016766 (0,45) 0,007
House has telephone -0,11113 (1,99) * -0,044 -0,05711 (0,88) -0,023 -0,10729 (2,37) * -0,042 -0,09125 (1,71) * -0,036
House has color t.v. -0,13351 (1,88) * -0,053 -0,07184 (0,85) -0,029 -0,07814 (1,41) -0,031 -0,07604 (1,14) -0,030
Running water in neighborhood 0,0024 (0,04)   0,001 -0,01692 (0,24) -0,007 -0,10411 (2,18) * -0,041 -0,11968 (2,15) * -0,047
Unemployment rate 1997 municipality 2,5753 (1,97) * 1,027 2,5781 (1,63) 1,028 1,7584 (1,60)  0,685 1,6943 (1,32)    0,659
Intercept 0,2018 (0,85)  0,3022 (1,06)   -0,17053 (0,89)   -0,14102 (0,63)  
Observed probability 0,49002 0,486882 0,41879 0,416982
Predicted probability (at means) 0,48769 0,483026 0,41307 0,410395
Number of observations 3206 2325 4365 3168
Log. Likelihhod -1860,08 -1360,75 -2762,89 -1982,4
Pseudo- R2 0,1627 0,1552 0,069 0,0788
* = significant at the 10 % level Table continues in next page 
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Table 10 - continuation Probit models of informal sector - definition 4
Dependent variable: probability of being an informal worker
Females Males
12 3 4
Variable Coeff. t-statistic dF/dx Coeff. t-statistic dF/dx Coeff. t-statistic dF/dx Coeff. t-statistic dF/dx
Age -0,00651 (2,71) * -0,002 -0,00906 (3,09) * -0,003 0,00237 (1,37) 0,001 0,00333 (1,56) 0,001
Years of schooling -0,09569 (13,80) * -0,029 -0,09046 (10,89) * -0,027 -0,06062 (10,77) * -0,020 -0,06084 (9,06) * -0,019
Dummy: Father's education is some secundary or more -0,17771 (2,13) * -0,051 -0,04305 (0,63)   -0,014
Lives in house or apartment 0,26411 (1,85) * 0,073 0,189525 (1,08) 0,053 0,14695 (1,22) 0,046 0,219278 (1,50) 0,064
Non-labor income/100.000 -17,5345 (0,57)   -5,328 -13,5074 (0,44)   -4,041 -229,447 (4,96) * -74,622 -248,63 (4,53) * -78,860
Ratio of rooms/persons in household 0,03368 (0,78) 0,010 0,022583 (0,45) 0,007 0,03696 (0,99) 0,012 0,025337 (0,57) 0,008
House has telephone -0,10114 (1,75) * -0,031 -0,13048 (1,92) * -0,040 -0,15388 (3,28) * -0,050 -0,12688 (2,30) * -0,041
House has color t.v. -0,2208 (3,21) * -0,071 -0,1555 (1,88) * -0,048 -0,28457 (5,11) * -0,097 -0,20845 (3,12) * -0,069
Running water in neighborhood -0,02833 (0,46) -0,009 -0,01921 (0,27) -0,006 -0,05632 (1,13) -0,018 -0,08426 (1,45) -0,027
Unemployment rate 1997 municipality 0,34401 (0,25) 0,105 0,296463 (0,18) 0,089 0,4565 (0,38) 0,148 -0,37843 (0,26) -0,120
Intercept 0,2439 (0,97)  0,3813 (1,25)   -0,06075 (0,29)   -0,10278 (0,41)  
Observed probability 0,25296 0,247742 0,2827 0,272412
Predicted probability (at means) 0,2303 0,224062 0,26134 0,249113
Number of observations 3206 2325 4365 3168
Log. Likelihhod -1651,88 -1185,46 -2416,26 -1724,53
Pseudo- R2 0,089 0,0892 0,0704 0,0705




Table 11 Probit models of informal sector with fertility- definition 2
Dependent variable: probability of being an informal worker
Females
12 3 4
Variable Coeff. t-statistic dF/dx Coeff. t-statistic dF/dx Coeff. t-statistic dF/dx Coeff. t-statistic dF/dx
Age 0,0159 (4,79) * 0,006 0,0151 (4,59) * 0,006 0,0269 (1,43)  0,011 0,0271 (1,42) 0,011
Years of schooling -0,1166 (14,43) * -0,046 -0,1161 (14,40) * -0,046 -0,1132 (12,49) * -0,045 -0,1121 (12,24) * -0,045
Lives in house or apartment 0,3823 (2,55) * 0,150 0,3898 (2,62) * 0,153 0,3299 (1,79) * 0,130 0,3332 (1,88) * 0,132
Non-labor income/100.000 -34,4111 (1,24) -13,713 -33,157 (1,22) -13,213 -36,547 (1,27) -14,563 -34,438 (1,12) -13,723
Ratio of rooms/persons in household 0,0063 (0,13) 0,002 0,0058 (0,13) 0,002 -0,0139 (0,30) -0,006 -0,0207 (0,42) -0,008
House has telephone -0,14461 (2,15) * -0,058 -0,1463 (2,18) * -0,058 -0,1042 (1,19)   -0,041 -0,1027 (1,18) -0,041
House has color t.v. -0,13051 (1,56) -0,052 -0,1291 (1,54) -0,051 -0,131 (1,57) -0,052 -0,1298 (1,56) -0,052
Running water in neighborhood 0,0063 (0,09) 0,003 0,0117 (0,16) 0,005 0,0001 (0,00) 0,000 0,0075 (0,10) 0,003
Unemployment rate 1997 municipality 4,9247 (3,03) * 1,963 4,8258 (2,96) * 1,923 5,0631 (3,10) * 2,017 4,9620 (3,06) * 1,977
Number of children younger than 12 (1) 0,0807 (2,34) *0 ,032 0,0963 (2,84) *0 ,038 0,3025 (0,74) 0,121 0,3413 (0,83) 0,136
Number of children younger than 5 that 
stay with one parent at home or work 
during weekdays 0,4999 (3,16) * 0,199  0,5503 (3,53) * 0,219
Intercept -0,56925 (1,88)  -0,5365 (1,78)  -1,1958 (1,06)  -1,2195 (1,07)
Observed probability 0,5167 0,5167 0,5173 0,5173
Predicted probability (at means) 0,5187 0,5187 0,5194 0,5194
Number of observations 2.123 2.123 2.111 2.111
Log. Likelihhod -1231,43 -1236,7 -1226,2 -1232,7
Pseudo- R2 0,1625 0,1589 0,1613 0,1568
(1) In columns 3 and 4  this is IV from models in Table 13. Table continues in next page
* = significant at the 10 % level 
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Table 11 - continuation Probit models of informal sector with fertility- definition 2
Dependent variable: probability of being an informal worker
Males
12 3 4
Variable Coeff. t-statistic dF/dx Coeff. t-statistic dF/dx Coeff. t-statistic dF/dx Coeff. t-statistic dF/dx
Age 0,0163 (7,54) * 0,006 0,0165 (7,65) * 0,006 0,0597 (4,38) * 0,023 0,0597 (4,51) * 0,023
Years of schooling -0,0637 (10,98) * -0,025 -0,0637 (10,98) * -0,025 -0,0560 (9,08) * -0,022 -0,0560 (8,70) * -0,022
Lives in house or apartment -0,1486 (1,20)   -0,059 -0,1467 (1,18)   -0,058 -0,3911 (2,63) * -0,155 -0,3911 (2,68) * -0,155
Non-labor income/100.000 -4,7588 (0,32) -1,869 -5,0006 (0,34) -1,965 -2,60023 (0,18) -1,021 -2,6068 (0,17) -1,024
Ratio of rooms/persons in household 0,0226 (0,63) 0,009 0,0227 (0,63) 0,009 -0,0041 (0,12) -0,002 -0,0041 (0,11) -0,002
House has telephone -0,1136 (2,14) * -0,045 -0,1131 (2,13) * -0,044 0,15154 (1,58)   0,059 0,15158 (1,60) 0,059
House has color t.v. -0,0683 (1,06) -0,027 -0,0664 (1,04)   -0,026 -0,06048 (0,94) -0,024 -0,0604 (0,95) -0,024
Running water in neighborhood -0,0913 (1,63) -0,036 -0,0906 (1,62) -0,036 -0,0805 (1,44) -0,032 -0,0805 (1,43) -0,032
Unemployment rate 1997 municipality 2,3823 (1,84) * 0,936 2,3830 (1,84) * 0,936 3,0898 (2,33) * 1,214 3,0901 (2,33) * 1,214
Number of children younger than 12 (1) 0,0521 (2,14) * 0,020 0,0492 (2,06) * 0,019 1,3293 (3,32) * 0,522 1,3294 (3,41) * 0,522
Number of children younger than 5 that stay 
with one parent at home or work during 
weekdays -0,0461 (0,55)  -0,018   -0,0011 (0,01)   0,000
Intercept -0,42 (1,82)  -0,4306 (1,88)   -3,57558 (3,56)   -3,5763 (3,63) *
Observed probability 0,4356 0,4356 0,4352 0,4352
Predicted probability (at means) 0,4304 0,4304 0,4299 0,4299
Number of observations 3.159 3.159 3.150 3.150
Log. Likelihhod -2009,2 -2009,3 -1998,76 -1998,8
Pseudo- R2 0,0713 0,0712 0,0733 0,0733
(1) In columns 3 and 4  this is IV from models in Table 13. Table continues in next page
* = significant at the 10 % level 
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Table 11 - continuation Probit models of informal sector with fertility- definition 4
Dependent variable: probability of being an informal worker
Females
12 3 4
Variable Coeff. t-statistic dF/dx Coeff. t-statistic dF/dx Coeff. t-statistic dF/dx Coeff. t-statistic dF/dx
Age -0,0022 (0,61) -0,001 -0,0023 (0,63) -0,001 -0,0121 (0,67) -0,004 -0,0121 (0,68) -0,004
Years of schooling -0,0916 (10,32) * -0,027 -0,0915 (10,29) * -0,027 -0,0940 (9,51) * -0,027 -0,0939 (9,39) * -0,027
Lives in house or apartment 0,2243 (1,44) 0,060 0,2240 (1,44) 0,060 0,2777 (1,50) 0,073 0,2771 (1,50) 0,073
Non-labor  income/100.000 0,793405 (0,03)  0,232 0,815 (0,03)  0,238 2,55241 (0,09)  0,745 2,6135 (0,08) 0,763
Ratio of rooms/persons in household 0,0217 (0,42) 0,006 0,0217 (0,42) 0,006 0,0218 (0,43) 0,006 0,0212 (0,41) 0,006
House has telephone -0,21816 (3,08) * -0,065 -0,2185 (3,09) * -0,065 -0,2375 (2,65) * -0,070 -0,2373 (2,68) * -0,070
House has color t.v. -0,18865 (2,32) * -0,058 -0,188 (2,31) * -0,057 -0,1954 (2,40) * -0,060 -0,1949 (2,42) * -0,060
Running water in neighborhood -0,0169 (0,23) -0,005 -0,0165 (0,22) -0,005 -0,0140 (0,19) -0,004 -0,0135 (0,18) -0,004
Unemployment rate 1997 municipality 1,5689 (0,89) 0,458 1,5715 (0,89) 0,459 1,4565 (0,82) 0,425 1,4596 (0,82) 0,426
Number of children younger than 12 (1) -0,0154 (0,43) -0,004 -0,0129 (0,37) -0,004 -0,2248 (0,58) -0,066 -0,2203 (0,58) -0,064
Number of children younger than 5 that 
stay with one parent at home or work 
during weekdays 0,0691 (0,40)  0,020 0,0579 (0,34)  0,017
Intercept -0,1102 (0,34)  -0,1078 (0,33)   0,4667 (0,42)  0,4621 (0,42)
Observed probability 0,2407 0,2407 0,2406 0,2406
Predicted probability (at means) 0,2146 0,2147 0,2147 0,2148
Number of observations 2123 2123 2111 2.111
Log. Likelihhod -1.056 -1.056 -1.050 -1050,6
Pseudo- R2 0,0989 0,0988 0,0982 0,0982
(1) In columns 3 and 4  this is IV from models in Table 13. Table continues in next page
* = significant at the 10 % level 
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Table 11 - continuation Probit models of informal sector with fertility- definition 4
Dependent variable: probability of being an informal worker
Males
12 3 4
Variable Coeff. t-statistic dF/dx Coeff. t-statistic dF/dx Coeff. t-statistic dF/dx Coeff. t-statistic dF/dx
Age 0,0035 (1,49) 0,001 0,0034 (1,50) 0,001 0,0234 (1,70) * 0,007 0,0236 (1,72) * 0,007
Years of schooling -0,0594 (9,14) * -0,019 -0,0594 (9,14) * -0,019 -0,0561 (8,18) * -0,018 -0,0561 (7,89) * -0,018
Lives in house or apartment 0,0903 (0,71) 0,028 0,0898 (0,71) 0,027 -0,0352 (0,24) -0,011 -0,0348 (0,22) -0,011
Non-labor income/100.000 -218,06 (4,65) * -68,711 -217,94 (4,65) * -68,674 -216,187 (4,62) * -68,120 -216,45 (4,97) * -68,203
Ratio of rooms/persons in household 0,0104 (0,23) 0,003 0,0104 (0,23) 0,003 0,0268 (0,64) 0,008 0,0274 (0,72) 0,009
House has telephone -0,1375 (2,46) * -0,044 -0,1376 (2,46) * -0,044 -0,02007 (0,20) -0,006 -0,0193 (0,19) -0,006
House has color t.v. -0,2532 (3,89) * -0,084 -0,2534 (3,91) * -0,084 -0,25292 (3,89) * -0,084 -0,2523 (3,91) * -0,084
Running water in neighborhood -0,0683 (1,16) -0,022 -0,0684 (1,16) -0,022 -0,0643 (1,09) -0,020 -0,0640 (1,09) -0,020
Unemployment rate 1997 municipality -0,6829 (0,47) -0,215 -0,6831 (0,47) -0,215 -0,2294 (0,15) -0,072 -0,2248 (0,16) -0,071
Number of children younger than 12 (1) -0,0379 (1,46) -0,012 -0,0374 (1,46) -0,012 0,5724 (1,41) 0,180 0,5743 (1,42) 0,181
Number of children younger than 5 that stay 
with one parent at home or work during 
weekdays 0,0081 (0,09)  0,003 -0,0184 (0,21)   -0,006
Intercept 0,0641 (0,25)  0,0661 (0,26)  -1,42931 (1,39)   -1,4418 (1,41)
Observed probability 0,2691 0,2691 0,2689 0,2689
Predicted probability (at means) 0,2461 0,2461 0,2461 0,2461
Number of observations 3159 3159 3150 3.150
Log. Likelihhod -1.708 -1.708 -1.703 -1703,4
Pseudo- R2 0,0713 0,0713 0,0711 0,0711
(1) In columns 3 and 4  this is IV from models in Table 13.





Percentage of women married or in free union that use contraceptive methods in 1995
Departamento PF1 PF2
1 ANTIOQUIA (SIN MEDELLIN) 76,2 62,3
2 MEDELLIN 75,6 62,2
3 ATLANTICO 67,3 56,8
4 BOGOTA 77,9 64,6
5 BOLIVAR (SIN CARTAGENA) 61,4 52
6 CARTAGENA 67,3 56,8
7 BOYACA 74,5 58,8
8 CALDAS 77,6 66,1
9 CAQUETA 67,7 51,3
10 CAUCA 70,5 50
11 CESAR 63,7 57,3
12 CORDOBA 61,4 52
13 CUNDINAMARCA 74,5 58,8
14 CHOCO 56,8 51,3
15 HUILA 67,7 51,3
16 LA GUAJIRA 63,7 57,3
17 MAGDALENA 63,7 57,3
18 META 74,5 58,8
19 NARINHO 70,5 50
20 NORTE DE ST. 74,2 58,1
21 QUINDIO 77,6 66,1
22 RISARALDA 77,6 66,1
23 SANTANDER 74,2 58,1
24 SUCRE 61,4 52
25 TOLIMA 67,7 51,3
26 VALLE (SIN CALI) 75,2 64,7
27 CALI 81,6 68,7
28 SAN ANDRES Y PROVIDENCIA 56,8 51,3
29 ARAUCA 56,8 51,3
30 CASANARE 56,8 51,3
31 PUTUMAYO 56,8 51,3
32 AMAZONAS 56,8 51,3
SOURCE: ENCUESTA NACIONAL DE DEMOGRAFIA Y SALUD 1995
NOTE: Territorios Nacionales was imputed the value of Litoral Pacifico
PF1=Percentage of women married or in free union that have present use of contraceptive methods





Table 12 - B
Family planning programs - Radio messages and contraceptive pill usage
REGION PF1_86 PF2_86 PF3_86 PF4_86
ATLANTICA 55,9 38,2 29,6 51,6
ORIENTAL 67,5 27,2 24 65,5
PACIFICA 60,4 33,5 24,7 66,1
CENTRAL 54 41,2 31,7 67,3
ANTIOQUIA 54 41,2 31,7 67,3
BOGOTA 51,1 43,8 18,4 74,8
ORINOQUIA . . . .
SAN ANDRES . . . .
SOURCE: ENCUESTA DE PREVALENCIA DEMOGRAFIA Y SALUD 1986
NOTE: ANTIOQUIA WAS INPUTED CENTRAL REGION VALUE
DEFINITIONS:
PF1_86=Percentage urban women that have never heard radio family planning programs.
PF2_86=Percentage urban women that have heard more than once radio family planning programs.
PF3_86=Percentage urban women that use contraceptive pills.
PF4 86=Percentage urban women married or in free union that use contraceptive methods.
Table 12 -C
Unemployment and labor force participation rates
1992 1997
TGP TD TGP TD
Barranquilla 0,56743 0,10917 0,54880 0,11747
Bogota 0,62724 0,08336 0,60476 0,10079
Cali 0,61112 0,09593 0,62246 0,17283
Medellin 0,59077 0,13775 0,57980 0,14799
Bucaramanga 0,63235 0,11957 0,63482 0,11305
Manizales 0,55586 0,09386 0,55938 0,12468
Pasto 0,61790 0,13329 0,64554 0,15015
Others (1)  0,60038 0,11042 0,59937 0,13242
(1) Others: the mean of the seven largest cities was inputed.
SOURCE: Encuestas de Hogares 1992 y 1997 siete principales ciudades (DNP)
Definitions:TGP=PEA/PETTD=DES/PEA
PEA = labor force
PET = population older than 12






                         "Fertility" regression - Sample of all workers heads of household or spouses (1)
                          Dependent variable: number of children younger than 12 years old sons of household head or spouse
Variable Females Males
123 4
Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic
Age -0,0462 (23,860) * -0,0463 (23,908) * -0,0336 (21,880) * -0,0337 (21,895) *
Years  of  schooling -0,0107 (2,148) * -0,0016 (0,225)  -0,0055 (1,265)  -0,0002 (0,028)  
Lives in house or apartment 0,2663 (2,699) * 0,2651 (2,689) * 0,1988 (2,056) * 0,2013 (2,081) *
Non-labor  income/100.000 -5,9 (0,380)  -4,8 (0,311)  -1,4 (0,122)  -1,2 (0,100)  
House has telephone -0,0991 (2,160) * -0,0969 (2,112) * -0,1619 (3,917) * -0,1615 (3,908) *
Percentage of women in dept. using modern contraceptive 
methods in 1995 -0,8497 (2,438) * -0,8075 (2,312) * -0,8775 (2,793) * -0,8564 (2,721) *
Percentage of women who use "madres comunitarias" for 
children younger than 5 in municipality 0,5293 (2,710) * 1,0012 (2,994) * 0,3153 (1,770) * 0,6015 (1,856) *
Interaction between Years of schooling and Percentage of 
women who use "madres comunitarias"in municipality -0,0744 (1,738) * -0,0453 (1,057)  
Constant 3,0506 (12,802)  2,9675 (12,215)  2,8355 (13,304)  2,7865 (12,776)  
Number of observations 2111 2111 3150 3150
Adjusted r-squared 0,2389 0,2396 0,162 0,1621
F-statistic 95,6 84,11 87,99 77,14
(1) The number of children is given only for those individuals who are household heads or spouses of the household head 




Table 14 Wage/earnings equations for formal and informal sectors under definition 2
Dependent variable: log(hourly wages) or log (hourly earnings)
Formal Informal
Female Male Female Male
OLS regressions Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic
Age 0,0748 (3,99) 0,0769 (4,35) 0,1898 (6,69) 0,0820 (6,86)
Age squared/100 -0,0505 (2,08) * -0,0323 (1,50) -0,1752 (5,33) * -0,0938 (7,15) *
Years of schooling 0,1367 (16,52) * 0,1467 (17,53) * 0,2543 (13,79) * 0,0709 (8,68) *
Unemployment rate 1997 
municipality -4,0499 (2,21) * -7,3863 (3,69) * 2,5892 (0,70) -0,0321 (0,02)
Intercept 4,7729 (11,45) * 5,2929 (12,37) * 3,3661 (4,33) * 9,8503 (27,36) *
Adjusted R-squared 0,189 0,186 0,143 0,077
Number of observations 1.624 2.511 1.399 1.684
HECKMAN selection model Coef. z-statistic Coef. z-statistic Coef. z-statistic Coef. z-statistic
Age 0,0631 (4,68) * 0,0789 (4,46) * 0,1947 (6,81) * 0,0837 (6,98) *
Age squared /100 -0,0587 (3,45) * -0,0316 (1,46) -0,1786 (5,42) * -0,0938 (7,15) *
Years of schooling 0,2739 (29,01) * 0,1352 (13,17) * 0,2023 (5,86) * 0,0595 (6,25) *
Unemployment rate 1997 
municipality -6,5567 (3,20) * -7,0955 (3,52) * 4,3456 (1,13) 0,4206 (0,24)
Intercept 3,1274 (8,07) * 5,4609 (12,50) * 2,8061 (3,32) * 9,5677 (25,17) *
Lambda (1) 1,7366 (0,04) *- 0 ,2989 (0,15) 0,6727 (0,38) 0,2484 (0,11) *
Log. Likelihood -4437,9 -7921,4 -5121,6 -5463,1
Number of observations 3.206 4.365 3.206 4.365
Number of censored observations 1.624 2.511 1.399 1.684
(1) Number in brackets is standard error for lambda * = significant at the 10 % level
List of variables used to identify selection:
Age
Years of schooling
Lives in house or apartment
Non-labor income/100.000
Ratio of rooms/persons in household
House has telephone
House has color t.v.
Running water in neighborhood
Unemployment rate 1997 municipality Table continues in next page 
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Table 14    continuation Wage/earnings equations for formal and informal sectors under definition 4
Dependent variable: log(hourly wages) or log (hourly earnings)
Formal Informal
Female Male Female Male
OLS regressions Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic
Age 0,1255 (5,90) * 0,1022 (5,44) * 0,2096 (5,41) * 0,1663 (7,46) *
Age squared/100 -0,0936 (3,58) * -0,0415 (1,88) * -0,1994 (4,37) * -0,1781 (7,08) *
Years of schooling 0,0727 (7,13) * 0,0554 (5,59) * 0,2245 (8,34) * 0,1870 (12,03) *
Unemployment rate 1997 
municipality 0,9387 (0,40)  -2,1484 (0,92) 5,2982 (0,99) -4,3443 (1,30)
Intercept 4,2568 (8,21) * 5,4583 (11,21) * 2,8333 (2,64) * 7,2789 (10,81) *
Adjusted R-squared 0,076 0,115 0,115 0,152
Number of observations 2.289 3.030 734 1.165
HECKMAN selection model Coef. z-statistic Coef. z-statistic Coef. z-statistic Coef. z-statistic
Age 0,1153 (6,32) * 0,1032 (5,50) * 0,2106 (2,84) * 0,1604 (7,19) *
Age squared/100 -0,0863 (3,89) * -0,0420 (1,91) * -0,1986 (2,31) * -0,1721 (6,84) *
Years of schooling 0,2076 (17,20) * 0,0395 (3,23) * 0,2500 (1,67) * 0,1376 (7,32) *
Unemployment rate 1997 
municipality 0,4467 (0,16) -2,0744 (0,88) 4,9383 (0,41) -3,9376 (1,16)
Intercept 2,2402 (4,22) * 5,7703 (11,40) * 3,0864 (1,05) 6,6910 (9,68) *
Lambda (1) 2,5765 (0,05) *- 0 ,4539 (0,20) *0 ,3397 (2,01) 0,8524 (0,18) *
Log. Likelihood -6582,3 -9443,5 (2) -4754,6
Number of observations 3.206 4.365 3.206 4.365
Number of censored observations 2.289 3.030 734 1.165
(1) Number in brackets is standard error for lambda * = significant at the 10 % level
(2) Maximum likelihood did not converge - results from two step estimation
List of variables used to identify selection:
Age
Years of schooling
Lives in house or apartment
Non-labor income/100.000
Ratio of rooms/persons in household
House has telephone
House has color t.v.
Running water in neighborhood
Unemployment rate 1997 municipality 
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Appendix 2 - Summary of legal definitions (in Spanish) taken from “Coding 




“Prestación social es lo que debe el patrono al trabajador en dinero, especie, 
servicios u otros beneficios, por ministerio de la ley o por haberse pactado en 
convenciones colectivas o en pactos colectivos, o en el contrato de trabajo, o 
establecida en el reglamento interno de trabajo, en fallos arbitrales o en 
cualquier acto unilateral del patrono, para cubrir los riesgos o necesidades del 
trabajador que se originan durante la relación de trabajo o con motivo de la 
misma. Se diferencia del salario en que no es retributiva de los servicios 
prestados y de las indemnizaciones laborales en que no repara perjuicios 
causados por el patrono. (...) Entendiéndose las prestaciones sociales como el 
mecanismo de seguridad social ideado por el legislador nacional para cubrir los 
riesgos que afectan el desempleo, la salud y la vida del trabajador, resulta 
apenas lógico que cualquier otro régimen, legal o convencional, orientado a 
amparar estas contingencias, constituirá igualmente una prestación social, en la 
misma forma que lo son las sumas de dinero o los beneficios que se reconocen 
por razón del accidente de trabajo, la enfermedad profesional o común, la 
maternidad, los gastos de entierro, el auxilio de cesantía, las pensiones de 
jubilación o vejez, las pensiones de viudez, orfandad e invalidez, garantías que 
no obstante su distinta finalidad especifica se agrupan dentro del genero de las 




Con respecto a la jornada de trabajo en el Art. 161 se hace precisión acerca de 
la misma:  
•   Art. 161.- DURACION. Subrogado. L.50/90, art.20. La duración máxima legal 
de la jornada ordinaria de trabajo es de ocho (8) horas al día y cuarenta y 
ocho a la semana, salvo las siguientes excepciones: 
a) En las labores que sean especialmente insalubres o peligrosas, el 
gobierno puede ordenar la reducción de la jornada de trabajo de acuerdo 
con dictámenes al respecto; 
b)  La duración máxima de la jornada de trabajo del menor se sujetará a las 
siguientes reglas: 1. El menor entre doce y catorce años solo podrá 
trabajar una jornada máxima de cuatro horas diarias y veinticuatro horas a 
la semana, en trabajos ligeros. 2. Los mayores de catorce y menores de 
dieciséis años sólo podrán trabajar una jornada máxima de seis (6) horas 
diarias y treinta y seis (36) horas a la semana. 
 
•   Art. 162.- Excepciones en determinadas actividades. 1. Quedan excluidos de 
la regulación sobre jornada máxima legal de trabajo los siguientes 
trabajadores: 
a)  Los que desempeñan cargos de dirección, de confianza o de manejo;  
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b)  (Los del servicio doméstico, ya se trate de labores en los centros urbanos 
o en el campo); 
c)  Los que ejercen actividades discontinuas o intermitente y los de simple 
vigilancia, cuando residen en el lugar o sitio de trabajo. 
 
Por otra parte en el mismo articulo se menciona que el número máximo de horas 
extras que pueden ser trabajadas, no podrá pasar de doce (12) por semana y se 
debe indicar si son diurnas o nocturnas y liquidarlas consecuentemente. 
 
 
CONTRATOS DE TRABAJO 
 
En el Código Sustantivo del Trabajo se menciona lo siguiente acerca de los 
contratos: 
 
•  Art.  45.-  Duración. El Contrato de trabajo puede celebrarse por tiempo 
determinado, por el tiempo que dure la realización de una obra o labor 
determinada, por un tiempo indefinido o para ejecutar un trabajo ocasional, 
accidental o transitorio. 
 
Por su duración, se determina la clasificación del contrato de trabajo, accidental 
o transitorio de duración inferior a un mes para llevar a cabo un trabajo 
ocasional; por el tiempo que dure la realización de la obra; por un termino fijo y 
de duración indefinida. 
 
Con respecto a los contratos a termino indefinido, se dice lo siguiente: 
 
•  Art.  47.-  Subrogado. D.L. 2351/65, art.5º. Duración Indefinida. 1. El 
contrato de trabajo no estipulado a término fijo o cuya duración no esté 
determinada por la de la obra o la naturaleza de la labor contratada, o no se 
refiera a un trabajo ocasional o transitorio, será contrato a término indefinido. 
2. El contrato a término indefinido tendrá vigencia mientras subsistan las 
causas que le dieron origen y la materia del trabajo. Con todo, el trabajador 
podrá darlo por terminado mediante aviso escrito con antelación no inferior a 
treinta (30) días, para que el patrono lo reemplace. En caso de no dar el 
aviso oportunamente o de cumplirse sólo parcialmente, se aplicará lo 
dispuesto en el artículo 8º numeral 7º, para todo el tiempo, o para el lapso 
dejado de cumplir. 
 
Relacionado con esto ultimo, se define el llamado preaviso en el Art. 46, numeral 
1; “ si antes de la fecha de vencimiento del termino estipulado – el del contrato – 
ninguna de las partes avisare por escrito a la otra su determinación de no 
prorrogar el contrato, con una antelación no inferior a treinta (30) días, éste se 




Cuando un empleado se enfrenta a una terminación del contrato sin justa causa, 
el empleador si debe indemnizar al empleado, en los términos que se señalan en 
el Art.64, “1. En todo contrato de trabajo va envuelta la condición resolutoria por 
incumplimiento de lo pactado, con indemnización de perjuicios a cargo de la 
parte responsable. Esta indemnización comprende el lucro cesante y el daño 
emergente.  2. En caso de terminación unilateral del contrato de trabajo sin 
causa justa comprobada, por parte del empleador o si éste da lugar a la 
terminación unilateral por parte del trabajador por alguna de las causas justas 
contempladas en la ley, el primero deberá al segundo una indemnización en los 
términos  que  a  continuación  se  señalan.  3. En los contratos a término fijo, el 
valor de los salarios correspondientes al tiempo que faltare para cumplir el plazo 
estipulado del contrato; o el del lapso determinado por la duración de la obra o la 
labor contratada, caso en el cual la indemnización no será inferior a quince (15) 
días. 
4. En los contratos a término indefinido, la indemnización se pagará así: a) 
Cuarenta y cinco (45) días de salario cuando el trabajador tuviere un tiempo de 
servicio no mayor de un (1) año; b) Si el trabajador tuviere mas de un (1)  año de 
servicio continuo y menos de cinco (5), se le pagarán quince días adicionales de 
salario sobre los cuarenta y cinco (45) básicos del literal a), por cada uno de los 
años de servicio subsiguientes al primero, y proporcionalmente por fracción; c) Si 
el trabajador tuviere cinco (5) años o mas de servicio continuo y menos de diez 
(10), se le pagarán veinte (20) años adicionales de salario sobre los cuarenta y 
cinco (45) básicos del literal a), por cada uno de los años de servicio 
subsiguientes al primero, y proporcionalmente por fracción, y  d) Si el trabajador 
tuviere diez (10) o más años de servicio continuo se le pagarán cuarenta días 
adicionales de salario sobre los cuarenta y cinco (45) días básicos del literal a), 
por cada uno de los años de servicio subsiguientes al primero, y 
proporcionalmente por fracción. (...) 5. Si es el trabajador quien da por terminado 
intempestivamente el contrato, sin justa causa comprobada, deberá pagar al 
empleador una indemnización equivalente a treinta (30) días de salario. El 
empleador podrá descontar el monto de esta indemnización de lo que le adeude 
el trabajador por prestaciones sociales. En caso de efectuar el descuento 
depositará ante el juez el valor correspondiente mientras la justicia decida. 